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"RIGHTEOUS FATHERS," "VULNERABLE OLD
MEN," AND "DEGRADED CREATURES": SOUTHERN




Although scholars have long addressed the role of legislators and local elites in
policing the color line between black and white, antebellum jurists hearing will contests
also played a special role, different from the roles they played in miscegenation
prosecutions, but just as effective, nonetheless. State court justices, who heard cases
involving bequests to the putative slave children of slaveholding elite men, exercised their
power to police by deciding when the color line had been breached. In those cases,
miscegenation between white men and slave women or free women of color was not the
problem, however. Instead, the color line was breached in those cases when white men
recognized and accorded slave women and their mixed-race children status through
manumission and property. Official recognition by white relatives meant access to
whiteness. Black personal freedom, combined with access to money and land, were threats
to the social order of slavery and white supremacy. Free blacks were deemed
uncontrollable and arrogant, particularly when they had money. They were perceived as a
bad influence upon the bonded. In the eyes of many jurists, wealthy free black status was
to be denied at all costs, for the benefit of the white social order, and the white relatives or
creditors seeking to establish their claim to the decedent's estate.
In this article, I explore the attitudes of antebellum jurists towards slavery,
miscegenation, and the transfer of property from elite white men to black slave women,
free women of color, and their mixed-race children, as found in antebellum will contests.
This article is a historical study, in which I do a case-by-case analysis and categorization of
the language used by state high court justices of the South in describing the white men who
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left wills that gave property to black women and their children. Although these cases have
been studied by historians and legal scholars in other contexts, reading these cases for the
purpose of discovering judicial narratives on miscegenation has not been the focus on
inquiry. As a result, scholarship on the full flavor of judicial responses to slavery is
missing.
I. SLAVERY, MISCEGENATION, AND THE LAW OF WILLS
Gradual emancipation and the rise of abolitionism in the North led to the
development of two different societies in antebellum America. Northerners, never as
reliant upon slavery as Southerners were, began to emancipate their slaves early in the
nineteenth century. With the rise of religious revivalism and a corresponding push for
social reform, abolitionism's influence grew in the North, as indicated by the founding of
the American Anti-Slavery Society.' Caught up in evangelicalism and rising free labor
in the form of massive immigration from Europe, Northerners began to resent the
existence of slavery, arguing that slavery was wrong and threatened free white labor.
2
Slavery led to immorality and laziness, as slave societies encouraged white indolence
and abuse of the blacks in their midst.
3
Thus, through the eve of the Civil War, conflicts over slavery grew more intense
on the national political scene. What had once appeared to be minor differences in the
early nineteenth century became irreconcilable as time went on.4  At stake were
competing moral visions of America's future. Would America be a land of the free, or a
land of the bonded? Was slavery immoral or not? Faced with scriptural references that
appeared to support slavery's existence, in conjunction with a growing secular culture
that supported it, and "the growing conviction that all workable societies needed a
permanent class of menial laborers in order to survive," those opposed to slavery in the
South "lost the will to denounce" it.5 By the mid-nineteenth century, slavery was dying
1. Edwin Gaustad & Leigh Schmidt, The Religious History of America: The Heart of the American Story
from Colonial Times to Today 184-88 (HarperCollins 2002).
2. Paul Finkelman, Defending Slavery: Proslavery Thought in the Old South 15-19 (Bedford/St. Martin's
Press 2003).
3. See e.g. More than Chattel: Black Women and Slavery in the Americas (David Barry Gaspar & Darlene
Clark Hine eds., Indiana U. Press 1996); Claire Robertson, Africa into the Americas? Slavery and Women, the
Family, and the Gender Division of Labor, in More than Chattel: Black Women and Slavery in the Americas,
supra, 3-40 (Indiana U. Press 1996); Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, Labor, and Ideology in the Early American
Republic 259-60 (Cambridge U. Press 1993).
4. See e.g. Ronald G. Walters, American Reformers: 1815-1860 (Eric Foner ed., Hill & Wang 1978). For
general histories of the Civil War, see William W. Freehling, The Reintegration of American History: Slavery
and the Civil War (Oxford U. Press 1994); Michael Perman, The Coming of the American Civil War (D. C.
Heath & Co. 1993).
5. Jon Butler, Grant Wacker & Randall Balmer, Religion in American Life: A Short History 240 (Oxford
U. Press 2003). Some of the biblical references included those in which "Old Testament patriarchs owned
slaves and the New Testament did not condemn them for it. Indeed, the New Testament urged slaves to be
obedient to their masters." Id. at 254. Moreover:
[M]ost slaves would have remained ignorant of Christianity if they had been left in Africa, where
their immortal souls would have perished in hell. Southern Christians also argued that the slavery
system compared favorably with the inhuman working conditions in the mines and factories of the
North. Above all, they believed that the slave system embodied a reasonable way to organize a




Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 40 [2004], Iss. 4, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol40/iss4/8
SOUTHERN JUSTICES ON MISCEGENATION
out in the North while it persisted in the South, where a slave society, believing itself
beleaguered by hordes of Northerners bent on expropriating slave property, was bent
upon protecting white supremacy and property rights at all costs.
The divergence between North and South had its effects upon the legal system.
Southern treatise writers like Thomas R. R. Cobb, who explained the law of slavery and
justified its existence, were a key link between the rhetoric of the theologians and the
lawyers and justices who upheld slave law in the courts. By the eve of the Civil War,
Northern jurists tended to support the efforts of slaves to become free immediately upon
arriving in free states, while their Southern brethren, oftentimes following the lead of
legislators, became more hostile to slaves in freedom suits.6  The suit for freedom
oftentimes grew out of bequests in wills, where a master attempted to free a slave and
grant the slave property in owning the self.7 The right to own property, a hallmark of
Anglo-American political theory and jurisprudence, did not apply to slaves.
The antebellum suit by slaves and free blacks for property left to them by former
masters was thus primarily a Southern phenomenon. As slaves, they could not own
themselves, and they could not own anything else. But as freed people, their status
became precarious. White slave society looked upon them with a jaundiced eye, as
uncontrollable, bad examples to the bonded. Freed men and women allegedly sowed the
seeds of discontent in slaves, inciting them to insolence and rebellion. Because they
were granted bequests of property by their slave masters, the slave women and their
mixed-race slave children became caught up in the machinations of white creditors and
relatives. These were the testators' heirs at law, people who might have been related to
them, all of whom were seeking to deny their family ties in a regime where family
inheritance represented the hallmark of whiteness.
Even though these slaves were members of the family through biological ties to
slave-master testators, they were not recognized as such, because the matter of sexual
relations between slave masters and slave women has long been a controversial one.
Statutory law did not make white men liable to prosecution for sexual contact with
female slaves, and
[c]hildren begotten upon slave women by their owners or by other white men would grow
up as slaves, adding to the property of the owners of the women and preserving the
amazingly durable fiction that male slaveholders and the other white males in the vicinity
were faithful to their wives.
8
Id. at 255.
6. See Paul Finkelman, An Imperfect Union: Slavery, Federalism, and Comity (UNC Press 1981); Walters,
supra n. 4.
7. See e.g. Finkleman, supra n. 6; Thomas D. Morris, Southern Slavery and the Law, 1619-1860 (UNC
Press 1996); Judith Kelleher Schafer, Becoming Free, Remaining Free: Manumission and Enslavement in New
Orleans, 1846-1862 (LSU Press 2003).
8. David A. Hollinger, Amalgamation and Hypodescent: The Question of Ethnoracial Mixture in the
History of the United States, 109 Am. Historical Rev. 1363, 1369 (2003).
Much of the recent controversy over Thomas Jefferson and Sally Hemings comes to mind, and the
willingness of historians to address the question of slavery and interracial sex, particularly when the reputation
of elite white men of the antebellum South has been at stake. Sally Hemings & Thomas Jefferson: History,
Memory, and Civic Culture (Jan Ellen Lewis & Peter S. Onuf eds., U. Press Va. 1999).
2005]
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Thus, public scorn was the most white men needed to fear. But even if their activities
were known, public scorn might not follow. In the brotherhood of white males, the
sexual exploitation of black women was an open secret; men participated, and the law
protected their white families from having to acknowledge these extramarital relations.
9
But the men discussed in this article chose to recognize the women and children through
the official legal channels of trusts and estates law, indicating that they were anomalous
to the general rule of denial and secrecy.
The Southern justices who presided over will contests involving white male
testators-cases in which slaveholding men left legacies of freedom and property to their
mixed-race children and the children's slave mothers-were faced with a paradox
stemming from competing moral perspectives of master-slave relations. Slavery, as a
cultural and social institution, was reinforced by religion and the secular law. Although
the justices did not point to scriptural verses, they used biblical language to justify their
decisions.10 The Bible recognized slavery as a practice, providing justification for pro-
But scholars have addressed this complexity in the lives of founders, these fighters for early American
freedom, who realized the paradox of living in a slave society. Henry Wiencek, An Imperfect God: George
Washington, His Slaves, and the Creation of America (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 2003); see also Joshua D.
Rothman, Notorious in the Neighborhood: Sex and Families across the Color Line in Virginia, 1787-1861
(UNC Press 2003); William Kaufman Scarborough, Masters of The Big House: Elite Slaveholders of the Mid-
Nineteenth-Century South (LSU Press 2003).
9. Hollinger, supra n. 8. Hollinger discusses prohibitions against black-white marriage leading to
exploitation of black women and the motivation for its prohibition: the children of black-white unions were
illegitimate, unable to inherit from their fathers. Id. at 1379. See also Edward E. Baptist, "Cuffy," "Fancy
Maids, " and "One-Eyed Men ": Rape, Commodiflication, and the Domestic Slave Trade in the United States,
106 Am. Historical Rev. 1619 (2001); Peter W. Bardaglio, "Shamefull Matches": The Regulation of
Interracial Sex and Marriage in the South before 1900, in Sex, Love, Race: Crossing Boundaries in North
American History (Martha Hodes ed., NYU Press 1999); Kathleen M. Brown, Good Wives, Nasty Wenches and
Anxious Patriarchs: Gender, Race, and Power in Colonial Virginia (UNC Press 1996); Elizabeth Fox
Genovese, Within the Plantation Household: Black and White Women of the Old South (UNC Press 1988)
[hereinafter Genovese, Within the Plantation Household]; Eugene D. Genovese, Roll, Jordan, Roll: The World
the Slaves Made (Random House 1974); Interracialism: Black-White Intermarriage in American History,
Literature, and Law (Werner Sollors ed., Oxford U. Press 2000).
That the late South Carolina Senator Strom Thurmond, ardent twentieth-century segregationist, as a
young man fathered a child by a black woman who once worked as a family maid, demonstrates the persistence
of a phenomenon that dates back to the Old South, and explains why this study is necessary. See e.g. Jeffrey
Gettleman, Final Word: 'My Father's Name Was James Strom Thurmond,' 153 N.Y. Times Al (Dec. 18,
2003); Marilyn W. Thompson, Woman Claims Thurmond as Father, Wash. Post Al (Dec. 14, 2003). What is
interesting to note, however, is the public response to the allegations. Members of the black community, long
familiar with the history of interracial sex, particularly those who had been eyewitnesses to Thurmond's
interactions with his daughter Essie Mae Washington-Williams, were not surprised. See e.g. Brian Hicks,
Schyler Kropf & Herb Frazier, News Comes as No Surprise to Many in S.C., Charleston Post & Courier Al4
(Dec. 14, 2003). Those who doubted the allegations, claiming that the story was so incredible that she must
have been lying, seem to have forgotten the secrecy and denial that generally followed these kinds of
relationships. Even though Thurmond denied the allegations all his life, he provided for his daughter's support,
and Washington-Williams kept her secret, not feeling free to come forward before his death in 2003.
Thurmond's family recognized her, however. See Michael Janofsky, Thurmond Kin Acknowledge Black
Daughter, 153 N.Y. Times A28 (Dec. 16, 2003). During an August 2004 visit to Columbia, South Carolina, I
saw a statue dedicated to him in 1999 that had the names of his four legitimate children listed. Washington-
Williams's name was added afterwards. But see Martha Hodes, White Women, Black Men: Illicit Sex in the
Nineteenth-Century South (Yale U. Press 1997) (discussing nineteenth-century miscegenation prosecutions
against white women and black men in interracial relationships and the greater protections under the law
granted to white women who accused black men of rape).
10. For example, "All who are under the yoke of slavery should consider their masters worthy of full
respect, so that God's name and our teaching may not be slandered." 1 Timothy 6:1 (New Intl.).
[Vol. 40:699
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slavery justices to promote its existence.I Moreover, the Bible could be used to justify
the separation of the races and the subordination of the African. Yet, the Bible was also
used to justify improving the condition of slaves or even to condemn slavery. Thus, in
the eyes of other justices, slavery was an unfortunate aspect of living in Southern society;
a distasteful, yet necessary practice, instrumental for white wealth and the proper
ordering of the society their ancestors had developed since the Colonial period. But
slavery also called upon these justices to exercise their greatest humanity, insofar as their
treatment of slave women and mixed-race slave children indicated benevolence.
These two impulses came into conflict in the will contest. On the one hand,
moralism, one's sense of proper moral behavior, could tend towards righteous
indignation: criticism of testators for sinning, committing adultery, and crossing color
lines. On the other hand, moralism could view care for slave children as examples of
pious atonement for sin: a father's fulfillment of an obligation to his child, as was noted
of Charles Bates. 12 Whether an individual judge was willing to let a testator do as he
wished thus depended upon not only the law of slavery, but on where the justice stood on
questions of personal and social responsibility. Were masters who had sex with their
slaves sinful? If their behavior was sinful, should a slave master be able to provide for
"the fruit of his sin," his slave child? If the Bible ordained slavery, what was the
obligation of a justice to the legal and social orders of a slave society? Should a justice
use the law of wills to punish a testator's moral failures, his fornication with slaves, or
was punishment solely a matter to be addressed by religious institutions?
This judicial power was not to be taken lightly. As arbiters of the law, elite men of
business and property would have looked to a justice like John Belton O'Neal, a former
practicing lawyer and advisor to men seeking to manumit their slaves and will them
property, for guidance in how to regulate their affairs. 13 But beyond that, justices set
forth the community standards, insofar as they established the parameters of behavior,
what other elite white men could do in their personal lives, and what sanctions might or
might not follow if social mores were transgressed. If a state passed strict manumission
laws, those laws determined whether an elite man could provide for slave women and
their children during his lifetime, but justices hearing will contests decided whether he
could provide for them upon his death. The appellate justices heard appeals from local
trial courts and set the standard that lower court judges and lawyers would follow in
making arguments and determinations. They guided jurors in explaining how they
should view constructions of fact in light of the law. In the case of slave masters seeking
to use the law of wills in providing for their slave children when the law of slavery
barred legal remedies or made them difficult to pursue, the high court justices were
called upon to arbitrate various interests, such as the testator's desire to do what he
11. See e.g. Bryan v. Walton, 14 Ga. 185, 202 (1853):
Our ancestors settled this State when a province, as a community of white men, professing the
[C]hristian religion, and possessing an equality of rights and privileges. The blacks were introduced
into it, as a race of Pagan slaves. The prejudice, if it can be called so, of caste, is unconquerable.
12. See Bates v. Holman, 13 Va. 502 (1809).
13. Discussed infra nn. 237-239.
2005]
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thought was proper, versus the community's interest in upholding slavery and punishing
immoral behavior. 
1 4
Of significance was whether a justice was willing to see a slave as being more than
mere property. As slavery died in the North and abolitionist fervor increased,
Southerners were defending their institution of slavery, and will contests point to how
the justices responded to one aspect of the growing debate: perhaps societal respect for
the paternalism of individual testators should be encouraged, an example for abolitionists
that slavery was not so terrible, and that slave owners were benevolent patriarchs. On
the other hand, perhaps the justices themselves were facing a conflict over their own
role: How would they be seen in the eyes of others as they tried to negotiate competing
demands? Were they willing to protect fathers and their children, or were they
overturning the religiously-ordained system of slavery by rewarding fornication across
color lines? In the cases before them, were the slave women victims worthy of
protection under the law?
These tensions in slave law point to a conflict inherent to slave societies of the
American South of the nineteenth century. If slavery could be justified as an economic
and social practice, and also on religious grounds, then what responsibilities did
slaveholders have to themselves, their slaves, and the white community? The women in
question were not white women granted greater rights under the social and legal orders.
A white woman could claim rape or ravishment. Community pressure could be brought
upon a white man to marry the white woman he took advantage of.15 But what
happened when the law left elite white men free to have sexual relations with slave
women but did not hold them legally accountable for their behavior, nor set forth any
obligation to care for their children by the women? Only the men's consciences could
control them.
The language of shame framed the judicial response, but that language indicated a
dualism. On one hand, atonement for sin could be found through a will and justified in
decisions granting bequests of freedom and property, and on the other, the language of
shame could be used as a post-mortem punishment for transgressions and denial of a
testator's will. Those justices who sought a "humane" slavery were likely to view
providing for slave children as atonement for sin and shame. 16 Those who were far more
interested in punishing dead testators and denying rewards to slave beneficiaries focused
more on defining testators who crossed the color line as immoral. Not only were these
testators reprehensible for having engaged in extramarital sexual relations, but they were
immoral for having contributed to the upheaval of what was perceived as the biblically-
ordained social order of slavery.
14. See e.g. Carmille v. Carmille, 2 McMul. 454 (S.C. 1842); Farr v. Thompson, Cheves 37 (S.C. 1839).
15. See e.g. Michael Grossberg, Governing the Hearth: Law and the Family in Nineteenth-Century America
33-63 (UNC Press 1985) (discussing white women making allegations of seduction, and the civil lawsuits that
followed).
16. I use the term "humane" to describe the rationale given by various justices for explaining why the
testators' wishes should be fulfilled: recognition of slaves' humanity might deflect criticism that slavery was
inhumane. As William E. Wiethoff explained, a "humane" slavery represented a balance: "Addresses to
humanity and interest-the moral imperative to treat slaves humanely and the South's interest in maintaining
slavery." William E. Wiethoff, A Peculiar Humanism: The Judicial Advocacy of Slavery in High Courts of the
Old South, 1820-1850, at 12-13 (U. Ga. Press 1996).
[Vol. 40:699
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Ultimately, the tensions between the justices lay in conflicts about how they saw
their duty to decide cases where moral, but not legal, transgressions were at stake:
extramarital sex with slave women and the granting of bequests of freedom and property
to them and the children born of their unions. At issue was whether white heirs would
inherit the estate over the testators' desire to provide for their slave children and the
children's mothers. Those in favor of respecting testators' wishes and those opposing
pointed to the same Bible but came up with different conclusions. Justices such as John
Belton O'Neall of South Carolina, who looked to ordain a humane slavery, pointed to the
moral obligations of fathers to their children.1 7 On the other hand, those like Justice
Joseph Lumpkin of Georgia, who focused more on the societal obligations they had to
the white community, were fearful that permitting such a humane slavery would mean
the unraveling of the social fabric and an evisceration of the natural order ordained by
God for the proper foundation of a slave society.
18
My purpose is not to romanticize and argue whether these relations were
consensual and affectionate. Without knowing the day-to-day relations of participants,
that is an impossible argument to make. But what matters is what the law set forth: black
women were property, personal in nature, real people not treated as such, capable of
being used and moved from one location to the next. Excluded from the presumption of
chastity and protection of their sexuality, black women were vulnerable to sexual abuse
and exploitation. Although the official record ignored interracial sex between master and
slave, will contests over real and personal property can offer strong evidence of its
presence. 19 In various cases, the appellate court found the evidence was presented at
trial through the will itself, or through the statements of witnesses who knew the
testator. Slave owners could speak through their wills and end the secrecy,
circumventing the informal rule of denial, with varying degrees of success: from
acknowledgement of their unions and offspring to outright rejection.
But in cases where the court opinions do not explain the circumstances of a
testator's benevolence, one can infer there was more at stake than simple kindness: the
goodwill of a patriarch towards his slave "children"-slaves deemed childlike, yet loyal
and obedient, thus earning his munificence. Particularly noteworthy are cases where a
widowed or single white man made unusual bequests to a slave or free woman and her
17. Judge O'Neall drafted the will and trust arrangement at stake in Farr to ensure that W.B. Farr's partner
and their son Henry would receive all his estate. See infra nn. 228-257.
18. See Vance v. Crawford, 4 Ga. 445,459 (1848).
19. Note, however, African American biographies and family histories that have told the story of interracial
sex. Edward Ball, Slaves in the Family (Farrar, Straus & Giroux 1998); Edward Ball, The Sweet Hell Inside.
The Rise of an Elite Black Family in the Segregated South (HarperCollins 2001); Josephine Boyd Bradley &
Kent Anderson Leslie, White Pain Pollen: An Elite Biracial Daughter's Quandary, in Sex, Love, Race:
Crossing Boundaries in North American History (Martha Hodes ed., NYU Press 1999); Gail Lumet Buckley,
The Homes: An American Family (Alfred A. Knopf 1986); Sarah L. Delany, A. Elizabeth Delany & Amy Hill
Hearth, Having Our Say: The Delany Sisters'First 100 Years (Dell Publg. 1993); Shirlee Taylor Haizlip, The
Sweeter the Juice (Simon & Schuster 1994); Harriet A. Jacobs, Incidents in the Life of a Slave Girl (L. Maria
Child ed., Oxford U. Press 1988); Carrie Allen McCray, Freedom's Child: The Life of a Confederate General's
Black Daughter (Algonquin Bks. 1998); Mark Perry, Lift Up Thy Voice: The Grimki Family's Journey from
Slaveholders to Civil Rights Leaders (Viking 2001); Henry Wiencek, The Hairstons: An American Family in
Black and White (St. Martin's Press 1999).
20. See e.g. Campbell v. Campbell, 13 Ark. 514 (1853); Ford v. Ford, 26 Tenn. 92 (1846).
2005)
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children, with no white wife or legitimate white child to take.2 1 He might have singled
out one slave child, described as the child of one of his female slaves, making it quite
clear that the child was not to be considered part of his estate. Instead, the child was to
be given special treatment: freedom, education, and money for the child's support. In
jurisdictions where statutes and case law constrained their ability to manumit, testators
sought other means: taking the woman and her children to Northern states where they
could live freely, or directing others to do so, and setting up trust funds for their
support.22 The testators crafted wills that they hoped would stick, but doing so had its
risks. Even when their relationships were well known, that did not mean that their
relatives and the white community were in acceptance. Living with black women on
levels of equality placed them beyond the pale, as transgressors of the social order who
betrayed their race and class.
Perhaps criticism and ostracism were the only means of exerting social control
upon men whose class and race privileges freed them to live their lives as they chose and
distribute their property how they wanted. As unmarried men, they had no white wives
and children to whom they had legal obligations. As the fathers of slave children, they
were not going to be prosecuted for miscegenation. But even if they ignored what others
had to say, the will contest might have been the means their relatives chose to get back at
these men who had been wayward and disrespectful of white conventions. By that time,
however, the men were dead and at the mercy of those same community members, white
men who either served on juries, or as trial court judges and appellate justices, to uphold
their wills when their collateral heirs-parents, siblings, aunts, uncles, nieces, nephews,
and cousins-challenged the will.
More often than not, undue influence or incapacity founded the basis of a relative's
claim. In trusts and estates practice, a person who makes a will, the testator, sets forth
the disposition of the property owned at the time of death. He names an executor,
someone trustworthy and responsible enough to see that his wishes are fulfilled. Under
normal circumstances, the executor presents the will to the probate court and it is
accepted. The executor then finds the assets, pays the estate's debts, and sees that the
bequests are made, just as the testator wanted. But when a will is challenged, the process
is disrupted and the will contest ensues. The challengers to the will might be people
named, who are challenging particular bequests, or collateral heirs challenging the entire
will as void-relatives who would take under the state's probate law if the will were
declared invalid. They might claim the testator suffered from some incapacity: he was
not of sound mind, and thus legally incapable of making a reasonable disposition of his
property.23 In the undue influence case, the claim might be that the testator was in a
21. See e.g. In re Hubbard's Will, 29 Ky. 58 (1831); Greenlow v. Rawlings, 22 Tenn. 90 (1842).
22. See e.g. Shaw v. Brown, 35 Miss. 246 (1858) (James Brown took his partner Harriet and their children
to Indiana; in his will he directed his estate should be sold and the proceeds sent to a Louisiana bank.); Jolliffe
v. Fanning, 10 Rich. 186 (S.C. 1856) (Elijah Willis took his partner Amy and her children to Ohio.); Farr,
Cheves 37 (W.B. Farr sent his son Henry to school in Indiana and, provided for his support.).
23. See e.g. Jolliffe, 10 Rich. 186; Ford, 26 Tenn. 92.
[Vol. 40:699
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vulnerable position, reliant upon someone in a confidential relationship with him who
induced him to act.
24
But in all cases discussed, the umpires were the justices who heard the will
contests. The attitudes of these elite jurists of the antebellum South covered a broad
range of responses, from tolerance of their slaveholding brethren in liaisons with black
women, to viewing them as sorrowful sinners trying to do right by their slave children.
To some, they were men caught in a terrible bind, who were only trying to fulfill their
responsibilities as fathers. To others, they were degraded creatures who transcended the
boundaries of illicit sex and undermined the whole social order of slavery. They were
insane; they must have been crazy to deny the interests of their white relatives and
elevate a slave with freedom and bequests of property. As benighted fools or helpless
old men, they were the pawns of overly powerful black jezebels who controlled them and
their households. These women were seeking to take advantage of the privileges their
sexual liaisons offered them. They exerted their undue influence, aiming to steal the
estate and thwart the legitimate interests of white family members.
But whether a justice was tolerant or intolerant of master-slave sexual relations, the
law of slavery gave room to deny the transfer of property for the benefit of creditors and
white heirs, notwithstanding the intent of the testator and any rights he might have had to
resolve his estate as he pleased. In those instances, the social order of slavery was more
important. This could even happen in Louisiana, the one Southern state known for its
greater tolerance of black-white liaisons.25 On the other hand, more liberal justices, such
as O'Neall of South Carolina, could also use the formal law of slavery for their own
ends, using their discretion to fulfill the intent of the testator, notwithstanding the
jurisdiction's preference for bondage over freedom. In some instances, those justices
acted as advisors and executors in fulfilling the wishes of their testator clients.
Scholars have long studied the question of just what accounted for the differences
in judicial opinions in the old South on the slavery question, and formalism has long
been the standpoint from which to ground inquiry.26 In deciding cases where the rights
of slaves were at stake, were justices following the formal rules of slavery, as developed
24. See e.g. Pool's Heirs v. Pool's Executor, 33 Ala. 145 (1858); Davis v. Calvert, 5 G. & J. 269 (Md.
1833).
25. The claim of liberality has grown out of the status that free people of color enjoyed. They had a
recognized place in antebellum Louisiana society, occupying a middle ground between whites and slaves.
They were landowners, artisans, merchants, and slave owners. In addition, concubinage was openly practiced
and tolerated, as a means of upward mobility for free black women in long-standing relationships with white
male protectors who supported them and their children. See e.g. Creole: The History and Legacy of
Louisiana's Free People of Color (Sybil Kein ed., LSU Press 2000); L. Virginia Gould, Urban Slavery-Urban
Freedom: The Manumission of Jacqueline LeMelle, in More Than Chattel: Black Women and Slavery in the
Americas, supra n. 3. This perception has also been expressed in popular histories and literature. Mary
Gehman, The Free People of Color of New Orleans: An Introduction (Margaret Media 1994); Anne Rice, The
Feast ofAll Saints (Ballantine Bks. 1979) (later made into a movie by Showtime Original Pictures in 2001);
Lalita Tademy, Cane River (Warner Bks. 2001). But notwithstanding this apparent tolerance, the French, very
early on, set forth in the Code Noir of 1724 the same prohibitions against interracial marriage enforced by the
English colonists. Jennifer M. Spear, Colonial Intimacies: Legislating Sex in French Louisiana, 60 Win. &
Mary Q. 1 (2003) (noting that, once again, prohibitions against interracial sex did not necessarily mean
enforcement).
26. A. E. Keir Nash, Fairness and Formalism in the Trials of Blacks in the State Supreme Courts of the Old
South, 56 Va. L. Rev. 64 (1970).
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by slavery's cultural and social orders to control blacks, or were they interested in setting
limitations upon masters? Reuel E. Schiller considered the various perspectives
developed by scholars to explain judicial motivation, A. E. Keir Nash suggested a
judicial personality theory, and Mark Tushnet advocated a hegemonic theory.2 7  In
Tushnet's view, the hegemony of slavery demanded that all members of the white
slaveholding elite maintain the legal and social orders of slavery: white supremacy in
support of black subordination. 28 Those slave owners who rejected the precepts of the
slave order were to be brought back in line. 29 But for the purposes of this article, Nash's
judicial personality theory arguably is the most appropriate analytical tool, insofar as it
explains conflicts among the justices hearing will contests. For even though the
hegemony of slavery was the general rule, how else might one explain the different
responses and opinions, and the conflicts on the bench?
30
Several of these cases have been studied in other contexts by other scholars of
slavery and the law, such as Paul Finkelman and William E. Wiethoff.3 1 Although
Adrienne D. Davis has built upon Tushnet's hegemonic theory in discussing the law's
role in determining the status of black women in relation to the men who owned them
and who bore children by them,32 what is missing, however, but which will be presented
here, is a comprehensive legal historical analysis of judicial attitudes towards testators in
those identifiable cases from the antebellum period where miscegenation had been
alleged. This approach will demonstrate the interplay of language and law, the cues of
language that described how these men were seen, and the communal debates as found in
testimony presented before the lower courts and reviewed in the appellate courts.
Finkelman focused on the development of slavery jurisprudence and its impact
upon interstate relations: How did Northern and Southern state court justices handle the
question of freedom and manumission in a nation with diverging positions on slavery?
33
Wiethoff, in his study of proslavery discourse, explains the role taken by antebellum
justices of the state high courts of the old South who perceived themselves as public
27. Reuel E. Schiller, Conflicting Obligations: Slave Law and the Late Antebellum North Carolina Supreme
Court, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1207, 1248 (1992).
28. See e.g. Mark V. Tushnet, The American Law of Slavery, 1810-1860: Considerations of Humanity and
Interest (Princeton U. Press 1981).
29. Using a Marxist perspective, Tushnet focused upon slave law: its structure, its emergence, and how
masters were controlled in their ability to inflict violence. Regarding cases like Mitchell v. Wells, 37 Miss. 235
(1859), discussed infra, he reflected on "the illegality of individual choice." Tushnet, supra n. 28, at 188.
30. For an earlier discussion of this rather contentious debate among scholars struggling to define the true
role of law and to understand the significance of judicial actors in a slave regime, see A. E. Keir Nash, Reason
of Slavery: Understanding the Judicial Role in the Peculiar Institution, 32 Vand. L. Rev. 7 (1979).
31. See Finkelman, supra n. 6; Wiethoff, supra n. 16.
32. Adrienne D. Davis, The Private Law of Race and Sex: An Antebellum Perspective, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 221
(1999). Note that Davis discusses several cases from the antebellum period, and extends her study to a few
subsequent to the war, as an exploration of how the private law of wills could be used for discriminatory
purposes, and as a caution to contemporary scholars interested in law and family policy issues, such as gay
marriage. Id. I use a legal history approach instead, focusing exclusively on the antebellum period and
covering identifiable cases of miscegenation. I seek to contribute to the history of judicial attitudes towards
slavery.
33. Finkelman, supra n. 6, at 1.
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figures with a special responsibility the legal culture accorded them to support slavery. 34
But the miscegenation issue exposes a conflict neither scholar addresses.
It is true that justices like Joseph Lumpkin were quite adamant that slavery was the
foundation of their Southern way of life. Justices who held this view exercised their
authority to act as bulwarks against black upward mobility by denying manumission and
the transfer of property from white to black. They established the legal framework
within which testators operated. By frowning upon testators who left bequests of
freedom and property to slave women and children, they guided the elite white
community on proper mores: no elevation of blacks to a level of social and economic
equality with whites.
Even so, testators, as other members of the elite, were free to follow or ignore the
advice of these justices. They had their own opinions. They could use the law of wills
for their own ends, and justices like O'Neall supported their decisions. As elite white
men, these justices could not quarrel with another white man's right to live his life and
dispose of his own property as he chose.35 A justice could vote against his slavery bias
and respect the wishes of a testator who took his fatherly duties seriously. These justices
freed slaves and gave them the bequests their fathers left them, notwithstanding their
disgust at racial mixing and their dislike of an increasing free black population. But that
also meant that miscegenation that took place behind the veil of secrecy escaped judicial
scrutiny, as did manumissions and grants of property that took place during a slave
master's lifetime, under circumstances that did not require a will or the intervention of
Southern legal institutions.
One might argue that the sale of slaves upon the dissolution of an estate or the
denial of slaves owning property was not unusual for its time, for under trusts and estate
law, all debts incurred by the decedent must be paid before anyone can inherit, and
slaves were personal property that could be bought and sold. 36 The sale of slaves was
complicated, however, by race and sex; the fact that black women were rendered
powerless by the caste system of slavery. If slave women and children were both
relatives of the testator and property he owned, what happened when they were freed by
a will but the estate did not have enough money to pay the debts? The law did not
accord them the rights of legitimate white family members-the wives and children who
easily inherited money, status, and security from their husbands and fathers. Because
these slave women and children were "illegitimate," they became subjects at the center
of will contests in which disgruntled heirs accused them of engaging in the nefarious:
forcing a white man to give them property, to the detriment of his legitimate family
members.
34. Wiethoff, supra n. 16. Among the justices he writes about are several whose opinions I discuss: Joseph
H. Lumpkin of Georgia; Alexander M. Clayton and William L. Sharkey of Mississippi; William Gaston,
Richmond M. Pearson, and John Louis Taylor of North Carolina; Baylis J. Earle, John B. O'Neall, David L.
Wardlaw, and Thomas J. Withers of South Carolina; Nathan Green of Tennessee; and Henry St. George Tucker
of Virginia. Id. Also included are Francis-Xavier Martin, Pierre A. Rost, and Thomas Slidell, all of Louisiana.
Id.
35. See also Baylis J. Earle, infra n. 250 (discussing the behavior of W.B. Farr); Thomas J. Withers, infra n.
282 (discussing the behavior of Elijah Willis).
36. Morris, supra n. 7, at 96-99.
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Evidence that tends to support this proposition comes from the status of the black
women and children at the heart of the will contest. They had no legal identity. The
women were invisible parties to the action, present only through the fruit of their sexual
activity. They and their children were minor actors, mere property, pawns in a power
play engaged by whites over the terms of a will. But in the end, these women's fates
were decided by the judges who supervised the game. Slaves were not permitted to
testify, and free blacks could not testify in matters involving whites. 37 Whites had
definite opinions about them, but slaves could not speak in their own defense. When
they were not maligning slave women as controlling jezebels, drunkards, and prostitutes,
witnesses testified to the existence of partnerships: black women managing households
who seemed to live on some level of social equality with white men.
Based upon the evidence presented in the decisions, one can get a sense of the
children's relationship with their fathers, but it is impossible to sense the nature of their
mothers' relationships with the powerful white men who controlled their lives. Were the
women rape victims or life partners in a regime where marriage was illegal? It is unclear
how much power they had in their relationships to negotiate for freedom and property for
themselves and their children. The decisions show us, however, that when slave masters
recognized black slave women and their mixed-race black children, intending that they
become free, the law could force them to remain in bondage. They could be denied the
property they were meant to have for their upkeep and support, something that would
never be done to married white mothers and legitimate white children.
This article comprises a study of appellate decisions reported from various state
supreme courts, where justices heard cases from the lower courts over questions of law.
Such opinions are valuable, insofar as they include the factual matters at the heart of the
dispute. But most important of all, they set forth the highest state court authority on
interracial matters and demonstrate the interplay between the local trial courts and the
high courts in establishing social norms and interpreting legislation. Although most of
the decisions were will contests, some grew out of commercial lawsuits where the status
of a black man or woman came into question: Was this person eligible to conduct
business transactions as a free person? The questions tumed on what had happened: how
did that individual became a free person who owned property? There had been some act
of manumission combined with a bequest of property from a will. Insofar as the
opinions include statements of the factual matters as determined by the trial court, they
generate an incredibly rich source of material on attitudes towards interracial sex and
family relationships. Will contests often generate their own drama, reminiscent of soap
operas, and those of the antebellum South were no exception. Justices heard cases that
exposed family secrets and rivalries and greed among family.
White family members fought for all they could get, for the law of slavery tended
to support their property interests. Huge sums of money-real property, cash, securities,
and personal property, including the slaves at the heart of the case--could be at stake.
38
37. See e.g. id. at 229-30; see also Ariela J. Gross, Double Character: Slavery and Mastery in the
Antebellum Southern Courtroom (Princeton U. Press 2000).
38. Where possible, I include information on the sums of money at stake, taken directly from the opinions.
Note that it might be possible to find out the approximate value of the sums in contemporary dollars. EH.NET,
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Moreover, the culture encouraged whites to criticize their men folk who had had sexual
relationships with black women that led to grants of freedom and property for the women
and their children, because the law did not obligate them to recognize familial ties to the
blacks in their midst. The creditors sought to get their debts paid out of the estate, and
were quite willing to make the slave women and their children pay for it, even if it had
never been the testator's intent that they be considered part of the estate.
The executors often looked to their responsibilities to fulfill the testators' wishes
and protect the women and children, but not always. They sometimes tried to take the
proceeds for themselves. The black claimants, when they were parties to the lawsuits,
asserted in turn their status as relatives and struggled for what they thought was
legitimately theirs-the bequests left to them by the men. And when their white relatives
denied their right to freedom, they were fighting for their very lives. At some times and
in some places, the white family members won, in others, the black relatives did.
Southern justices acted as referees in hearing those cases, and opponents of black
freedom and wealth policed the color line. Southern justices disinherited in the name of
maintaining slavery and white supremacy, particularly as Northern anti-slavery
sentiment increased in the 1830s to 1850s, and Southern legislatures tightened their
manumission laws.
In addressing how the justices saw the testators, I look at individual cases and
focus on categories of responses; discovering the nuances of judicial behavior, instead of
making broad generalizations within and across jurisdictions. 39 A testator could have
been a virtuous father, a victim, a degenerate, or all at the same time: a "Righteous
Father,' '4 a "Vulnerable Old Man,' 4 1 or a "Degraded Creature.' 4 2 But most noteworthy
was that the positions taken by the justices could be different from how those who
challenged the will saw the testator, only demonstrating the tensions within the
slaveholding elite as they grappled with interracial sex and the transfer of property.
Where those challenging the will saw a vulnerable man, the judges might have seen a
lucid and rational man of business who knew what he wanted to do with his property.
Narrative drove much of the judicial inquiry; in these will contests, the behavior
and actions of the testator prior to his death were under scrutiny. His lifestyle was being
called into question. Had he been the victim of an overreaching slave? Did he suffer
from some sort of mental incapacity? Could his unorthodox last will and testament have
been explained by his blatant transgression of social mores? Was he a father just trying
to take care of his children? How would the slave order be affected if the will were to
stand? All these questions had to be answered as the justices were negotiating the rights
How Much is That?, http://www.eh.net/ehresources/howmuch/dollarq.php (accessed Oct. 1, 2005). See also
EH.NET, Commentary, http://www.eh.net/ehresources/howmuch/sourcenote.php (accessed Oct. 1, 2005).
39. But in the case of Louisiana, I will do a more in-depth analysis of the state's jurisprudence, insofar as its
apparent exceptionalism compels such an inquiry.
40. See e.g. Le Grand v. Darnall, 27 U.S. 664 (1829); Campbell, 13 Ark. 513; Narcissa's Executors v.
Wathan, 41 Ky. 241 (1842); In re Hubbard's Will, 29 Ky. 58; Greenlow, 22 Tenn. 90; Dunlop v. Harrison's
Executors, 55 Va. 251 (1858); Foster's Adminstr. v. Fosters, 51 Va. 485 (1853); Bates, 13 Va. 502.
41. See e.g. Denton v. Franklin, 48 Ky. 28 (1848); Davis, 5 G. & J. 269; Ford, 26 Tenn. 92.
42. See e.g. Pool's Heirs, 33 Ala. 145 (1858); Bryan v. Walton, 33 Ga. Supp. 11 (1864); Vance, 4 Ga. 445;
Shaw, 35 Miss. 246; Hinds v. Brazealle, 3 Miss. 837 (1838); Jolliffe, 10 Rich. 186; Farr, Cheves 37.
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of slave master fathers and the interests of a slave society. But in some instances,
justices ignored paternal relationships, drawing upon the formal law of slavery in order
to deny freedom.43 The goal was to uphold the slave order, as the hegemony school
would suggest. Hard-line justices were more likely to take this position. More liberal
justices, however, could be just as formalist in focusing upon the law of slavery and
ignoring the question of paternal relationships. But their formalism took different
shapes, and resulted in decisions that appeared to benefit the slave beneficiaries, thus
pointing to the significance of the judicial personality thesis. 44
II. THE RIGHTEOUS FATHERS: DECENT MEN CAUGHT IN A BIND?
The term "righteous fathers" can be used to describe those testators whose care for
their children and the children's mothers elicited judicial tolerance or neutrality, if not
admiration and respect. The justices who upheld the men's wills appeared to have an
unusual view of mixed-race sexual relations in a slave regime. White men providing for
slave and free women in close relationships to them and caring for their slave children
did not seem extraordinary in these justices' eyes. It appeared to be a matter-of-fact
occurrence. Thus, the justices did not respond with rancor in determining whether the
black and mixed-race beneficiaries should receive under the will or keep the property
they had been given. Their tolerance led them to fulfill testators' wishes and affirm the
transfer of property. But this tolerance did not necessarily entail an awareness of any
power imbalances experienced by women that might have required greater legal
protections for them and their children.
Nicholas Darnall, born sometime in 1803, grew up in Ann Arundel County,
Maryland, the son of Bennett Darnall and an unnamed slave woman.4 5 In his will,
Bennett gave Nicholas several tracts of land, including Portland Manor, on 596 acres.
46
Apparently, there were two deeds of manumission executed by Bennett purporting to
free Nicholas and various other slaves. 4 7 This case, which went all the way up to the
United States Supreme Court, was not a suit for freedom. Nicholas, upon arriving at
adulthood, took control of the property, but the question was whether he had legitimate
title to property he was seeking to sell in 1826.48 Under Maryland law, a master wishing
to free a slave could do so by will, but not if the slave was under forty-five years old and
unable to support himself.4 9 Because the Maryland court of appeals had recently heard
another case, in which a two-year-old infant was denied freedom based on this
inability, 50 Nicholas and the buyer of some of the property, Claudius F. Le Grand,
43. See e.g. Mitchell, 37 Miss. 235; Thomas v. Palmer, 54 N.C. 249 (1854); Green v. Lane, 45 N.C. 102
(1852); Bennehan's Executor v. Norwood, 40 N.C. 106 (1847); Cunningham's Heirs v. Cunningham's
Executors, I N.C. 519 (1801).
44. See e.g. Cooper v. Blakey, 10 Ga. 263 (1851); Mallet v. Smith, 6 Rich. Eq. 12 (S.C. 1853); Broughton v.
Telfer, 3 Rich. Eq. 431 (S.C. 1851); Carmille, 2 McMul. 454; Mutual Protection Ins. Co. v. Hamilton &
Goram, 37 Tenn. 269 (1857).
45. Le Grand, 27 U.S. at 667.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 665.
48. Id. at 667-68.
49. Id. at 668.
50. Hamilton v. Cragg, 6 Harris & Johns. 16 (Md. 1823).
[Vol. 40:699
14
Tulsa Law Review, Vol. 40 [2004], Iss. 4, Art. 8
https://digitalcommons.law.utulsa.edu/tlr/vol40/iss4/8
SOUTHERN JUSTICES ON MISCEGENATION
decided to suspend the sale, particularly when Bennett's heir at law "made claim to the
land, and threatened to commence suit for the recovery of it." 5 1 Le Grand and Nicholas
brought their case to determine Nicholas's status and to clear up the cloud on title.
52
Nicholas was eleven years old when his father died.5 3 Was he capable of taking care of
himself at the time? Was he a slave at the time of his father's death?
The Supreme Court found that the evidence was in favor of Nicholas. The rule
with respect to manumitting those incapable of taking care of themselves did not apply,
according to Justice Gabriel Duvall, because four respectable witnesses from the
community vouched for him: "Nicholas was well grown, healthy and intelligent, and of
good bodily and mental capacity," 54 fully capable of finding a job to support himself.
Moreover, Bennett had devised to Nicholas and his brother a considerable estate. The
young men then did what any responsible young men would have done: "had guardians
5,5 5 6
appointed, [and] were well educated." 5 As a result, Nicholas was affluent. Moreover,
even if he were a slave at the time of his father's death, the fact that he was bequeathed
property made him free by implication. 57  Thus, Justice Duvall had no doubt that
Nicholas Damall was fully capable of selling his property.
58
Damell's case, from Maryland, and others from Virginia, express a rather liberal,
matter-of-fact attitude taken by justices toward master-slave sexual relations and grants
of property to slave women and the slave children of testators. It was regrettable that
white men had sex with black women who then gave birth to mixed-race children, but
that was the nature of their society. One early case from 1809 grew out of a question
regarding whether a will had been revoked. 59 When Charles Bates was a young man and
single, he made up his first will. 60  The year was 1799, and he left his estate to his
parents and siblings.6 1 Judge Fleming noted that in 1803, Bates was still unmarried, but
he had a slave daughter he mentioned in his second will:
[Hlaving formed an imprudent (though not uncommon) temporary connection ...he
recognized the fruit of his unhappy amour, called her his daughter Clemensa, declared her
to be free, gave particular directions respecting her education, and made a handsome
permanent provision for her, manifesting thereby a laudable instance of natural affection,
and making the best atonement in his power, for his former indiscretion.
62
51. Le Grand, 27 U.S. at 668.
52. Id. at 668-69.
53. Id. at 667.
54. Id. at 669-70.
55. Id. at 670. For a discussion of Duvall's career, see David P. Currie, The Most Insignificant Justice: A
Preliminary Inquiry, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 466 (1983); Frank H. Easterbrook, The Most Insignificant Justice:
Further Evidence, 50 U. Chi. L. Rev. 481 (1983); The Oxford Companion to the Supreme Court of the United
States 240-41 (Kermit L. Hall et al. eds., Oxford U. Press 1992). Duvall leaned toward antislavery.
56. Le Grand, 27 U.S. at 670.
57. Hall v. Mullin, 5 Harris. & Johns. 190, 194 (Md. 1821).
58. Le Grand, 27 U.S. at 670.
59. Bates, 13 Va. 502.
60. See id. at 502.
61. See id. at 502-03.
62. Id. at 540-41 (emphasis in original).
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Three years later, Bates married. 63 Thereafter, he cut off his signature from the
second will and revoked the first one in a note onto the cancelled second will.6 4 He kept
both copies, however. 65 By the time Bates died in 1808, his father was dead, and he was
concerned about whether he had provided well for his mother.66 He mentioned to others
that he had a will, the first one he wrote years before, but he wanted to change things.
67
He did not make the changes before his death, and did not mention anything with respect
to provisions for his wife. They had no children. The issue was whether by saying he
had a will, the first one, he had republished it.
68
The court decided the case after a second hearing and argument. The district court
found in favor of the first will, but the justices of the supreme court were unwilling to
support that position.69 Bates died without a will. He cancelled the second one, and his
statements that he had a will did not mean that the revoked first will had been
republished.7 ° Clemensa did not receive the benefits she would have gained under the
second will. Notwithstanding Clemensa's loss, Fleming's admiration for Bates gives
impression that had the second will not been revoked, the court might have been willing
to let it stand.
About twenty years later, Francis Foster of Henrico County was the patriarch of a
group of slaves, most of whom seemed to be connected to him by family ties.7 1 William
Foster was his son. In addition, he had several children by a slave woman named Betsey
Johnson: Martha Ann, Ellen, Eliza, and William Johnson. 72 He also other children by
other slave women. Wishing to free his children and their mothers, he brought them to
New York City in 1831 for the express purpose of doing so.7 3 Included were William
Foster, Betsey, Francis, and Thomas Johnson. 7 4 He emancipated them by deed, having it
witnessed and acknowledged by the mayor of New York.75 But when he died, his
executor seized them, claiming they belonged to the estate.
7 6
Justice Green B. Samuels, writing for the Virginia Supreme Court on the appeal of
a court order granting their freedom, noted that "before going to New York, and whilst
there, and after his return, [Francis Foster] spoke of the trip to that place as intended for
the sole purpose of giving freedom to the objects of his favor."77 After Francis Foster
manumitted them all, they returned to Virginia and "lived together as a family upon
63. Id. at 506.
64. Bates, 13 Va. at 505-06.
65. Id.
66. See id at 502-11.
67. Id.
68. Seeid. at 502-10.
69. Bates, 13 Va. at 520-48.
70. See id. at 543-48.
71. Foster's Adminstr., 51 Va. at 485-87.




76. Foster's Adminstr., 51 Va. at 485-87.
77. Id. at 486.
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terms of equality." 78 Foster imagined that his manumission plan would circumvent the
Virginia rule that required those emancipated in Virginia to leave the state within twelve
months upon manumission.79 Since they were emancipated elsewhere, he imagined the
law might not apply.80 He later manumitted others of his slaves by a will dated 1835 and
probated in 1836. 8 1 None of those manumitted in 1831 were listed in his estate.82 They
lived as free people for about twenty years, even though they had not been registered as
free, until 1850, when they were taken into custody and claimed as slaves.
83
Neither Samuels, nor any of the other justices, commented upon whether Foster
was acting improperly in acknowledging his slave children and their mothers and living
with them as a family, thus indicating a matter-of-fact acceptance of the lifestyle he
chose. They refused to view his removal to New York as an illegal attempt to
circumvent Virginia law; instead, he shopped for a forum and used a method that
fulfilled his wishes, a perfectly legal and above-board strategy.84 He never intended that
any of them live as slaves ever again, and he treated them accordingly: "Thus there was
nothing in the law to prevent Foster from taking his slaves whithersoever he chose for
any reason that to him seemed good: To hold otherwise would be an unjust interference
with his rights [to relinquish] property." 8
5
But a few years later, that right to dispose of property did not extend to free people
of color inheriting slaves. Nathaniel Harrison of Amelia County died unmarried in the
summer of 1852. 86 In his will, he left three women of color-Frankey Miles, Ann Maria
87Jackson, and Laurena Anderson-a tract of land each. Another tract went to Edwin
Harrison's four youngest children, and each child received one hundred dollars.
88
Frankey Miles was to receive six hundred dollars a year as an annuity for life; Laurena
and Ann Maria were to receive two hundred and fifty dollars.89 Additionally, he left the
women all his household and kitchen furniture.
90
It is quite telling that Harrison put contingencies in place for each of the
beneficiaries, "in the event of their being required to leave the state." 9 1 The women
were all free people of color, a primary population of people in the antebellum South
who could be compelled to emigrate. 92 He left them his entire estate. But in Justice




81. Foster's Adminstr., 51 Va. at 487.
82. Id.
83. See id. at 485-87.
84. See id. at 485.
85. Id. at 490.
86. Dunlop, 55 Va. at 251.




91. Dunlop, 55 Va. at 252-53.
92. See e.g. Neither Slave nor Free: the Freedman of African Descent in the Slave Societies of the New
World (David W. Cohen & Jack P. Greene eds., Johns Hopkins U. Press 1972) [hereinafter Neither Slave nor
Free]; Genovese, Within the Plantation Household, supra n. 9.
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was a substantial estate: twenty-five hundred acres of land, eighty-four slaves, stock,
crops and perishables, and about eighteen thousand dollars in money and bonds.
9 3
Harrison's executors were to become trustees of the estate for the support of Frankey,
Laurena, and Ann Maria, and the children of the latter two, free from the debts and
liabilities of their husbands.94 If his slaves had to be sold in order to create the trust, he
wanted them to be sold to good masters in good homes.
95
This was the most controversial clause of the will, that by inheriting the entire
estate, these free black women would gain ownership of slaves. Lee, in writing for the
entire court, noted that under statutory law, "no free Negro shall be capable of acquiring
(except by descent) any slave other than the husband, wife, parent or descendent of such
free Negro." 96 Perhaps the purpose of the law was "to keep slaves as far as possible
under the control of white men only, and prevent free negroes from holding persons of
their own race and color in personal subjection to themselves. Perhaps also it intended to
evince the distinctive superiority of the white race." 97 Arguably, it also aided free blacks
attempting to help their relatives still in slavery. Notwithstanding the proscription
against ownership, the women could inherit, nonetheless, because "[i]t was never
intended to forbid the free negro to take the value of slaves in money or other
property." 98 The slaves could be sold and the proceeds set aside for the benefit of the
women of color.
99
The legatees, Harrison's next of kin, were concerned that the women should inherit
only what was necessary for their support, as per the residue of the estate. l0 0 They
hoped to limit the statement "support and maintenance" to mean only the bare minimum
of what might be required. 10 1 The justices did not agree, and gave them everything: "the
expression of a particular purpose for which the gift is made will not operate as a
condition or limitation of the bequest."' 0 2  They were more interested in fulfilling
Harrison's general intent to give the women the entire residue, because:
[T]he most unbounded indulgence has been shown by the courts to the ignorance,
unskillfulness and negligence of testators, and judges have even shown themselves astute
in averting their effects.... [E]very allowance will be made for his want of better
knowledge of the law as well as those of grammar and orthography. Where he may have
obscured his meaning by conflicting expressions, his intention is to be sought rather in a
rational and consistent than an irrational and inconsistent purpose. And if the will may
admit of more than one construction that is to be preferred which will render it valid and
effectual. 
10 3
93. Dunlop, 55 Va. at 252-53.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 258.
97. Id. at 260-61.
98. Dunlop, 55 Va. at 259.
99. Id.
100. Id. at254.
10L. Id. at 252.
102. Id. at 267.
103. Dunlop, 55 Va. at 263.
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With the exception of the bequests of slaves, the matters in contention seem rather
uncontroversial. Missing was the vitriolic language found in other cases of this nature
where a white man left a substantial estate to people of color. Missing too was an
explanation of the relationship Nathaniel Harrison had with Frankey Miles, Ann Maria
Jackson, Laurena Anderson, and Edwin Harrison's children. But once again, a similarity
to other decisions can offer an explanation. Harrison was unmarried and had no known
legitimate children. But he did have close connections with a group of women of color
such that he felt obliged to provide for them to the exclusion of his white relatives, the
collateral heirs who sued. 10 4 It might have been known to all that these people of color
may have been his family, but it was not stated openly.
In the case of Greenlow v. Rawlings, 10 5 there was no doubt about the nature of the
relationship between the testator, Isaac Rawlings, and William Isaac Rawlings. In
February 1837, Isaac petitioned the Shelby County Court to emancipate William, his son
by a mulatto slave woman. 10 6 Isaac always recognized him as his son, insofar as
William was "brought up in his family as a free boy-and so regarded by the said Isaac,
who never intended he should be a slave."' 10 7  The chairman of the county court
examined the petition and authorized it as being in accordance with the law.10 8 Isaac
then gave bond, so that William would never become a charge of the state if he ever
became unable to support himself. 109 In his will, Issac made William executor and gave
him his entire estate: all his real and personal property.1 10 The action before the court
arose out of a note given by Thomas Rawlings to Isaac in July of 1837.111 William
signed it over to a creditor, J.O. Greenlow, in May of 1841, but Thomas Rawlings
refused to pay, on the basis "that the endorser [William Isaac Rawlings], at the time of
the endorsement and still, was a slave, and the endorsement void."
1 12
The trial court judge instructed the jury that the record of evidence proved that
William was free. 113  His status could not be questioned, and the jury held for
Greenlow.114 On Thomas Rawlings's appeal, Justice Nathan Green noted in his opinion
for the court that, although under statutory law a newly manumitted slave must leave the
state as "part of the judgment" of emancipation, 115 an exception could be made in those
cases where the contract for manumission was made prior to 1831.116 There was no
direct evidence establishing that fact in William's case; however, the court presumed it
was found in the decree of emancipation signed by the court officer. 117 The chairman of
104. id. at 252-53.
105. 22 Tenn. 90.
106. Id. at 91-92.
107. Id. at 92.
108. Id. at 91.
109. Id.
110. Greenlow, 22 Tenn. at 91.
Ill. Id.
112. Id. at 91-92.
113. Id. at 92.
114. Id.
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the county court had the opportunity to read the petition and examine the parties.
118
Evidence of an agreement to free William could be found in what the court called
"parol" evidence, the nature of the interactions between Isaac and William based upon
the presumption of an oral contract between them. 19 It was obvious that a slave raised
like a free-born son in his father's house was only nominally a slave, for he knew his
father would free him.
William Isaac Rawlings was lucky, in that his route to manumission was a simple
one. His father performed the manumission during his life, thus easing his ability to
inherit as the only beneficiary of his father's property. But others were not as lucky.
Perhaps the testator did not do as good a job of protecting the interest of his children and
helping them gain their freedom. Perhaps white relatives of the decedent, collateral
heirs, and executors colluded to destroy a will and undermine the testator's intent to free
slave relatives and grant them property. 120 They might have threatened the testator.
Finally, those trusted and charged with protecting a slave beneficiary could have violated
their bonds of trust, and attempted to take the estate for themselves.
Narcissa, a slave and reputed daughter of Austin F. Hubbard of Nelson County,
Kentucky, was one of the unlucky ones. 121 The county court admitted to probate a will
in which Hubbard devised to her all his estate, provided her owner sell her freedom at a
moderate and reasonable price.122 Apparently, Narcissa and her mother had been owned
by another, but were hired by Hubbard. 123 They lived in his house as servants. 124 If
Narcissa did not become free, all went to Austin F. Hubbard, Jr., the testator's
illegitimate son. 125 Hubbard's heirs claimed he was of unsound mind when he made the
will. 126 He was an alcoholic, prone to drunken fits and delirium. 127 But that fact alone
did not mean he was incompetent to make a will, according to Justice J.R.
Underwood. 128 The court found that when Hubbard made the will, he was quite sane
and lucid. 129 He knew what he wanted to do, and expressed his reasons for doing so:
Narcissa was a faithful servant, she and her mother had been living in his house, and
118. Id.
119. Id. at 93-94.
120. See e.g. Dickey v. Malechi, 6 Mo. 177 (1839). Bazil Simmino, a brother of the deceased, Antoine
Simmino, testified in a case of a lost will that his sister, the wife of one of the executors, colluded to destroy the
will because it was ."ungrateful' towards the family of Antoine Simmino, as it gave the greater part of his
property to a half negro." Id. at 184. The factual information is somewhat murky, but Francis Malechi sued to
have the will probated; he brought his case by a guardian. Id. at 179. It is unclear whether he had a guardian
because he was a minor, or because he was a person of color. The court did not state whether the allegations of
his racial background were taken to be true.




125. Id. at 58.
126. Hubbard's Will, 29 Ky. at 58-59.
127. Id.
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there were no other whites present. 130 They were the ones he was closest to, because he
was not married and had no legitimate children.
13 1
Hubbard had the will drawn by a draftsman. 132 He then gave it to Narcissa for
safe keeping, telling her that it was something important. 133 Underwood applauded
Hubbard's intent to provide for his daughter: "The obligation, in the nature of things, to
protect and provide for illegitimate children, should be held as sacred as that to provide
for legitimates. Indeed, it is the best civil atonement for the guilt of fornication."
134
What is most surprising, however, was that Underwood thought it was proper for
Hubbard to provide for her, his illegitimate mixed-race daughter, over "a son not tainted
by African blood," because of "the faithful services of the one which he acknowledged,
and the offensive conduct of the other, which had produced their separation." 135 It is
unclear just what had happened between Hubbard and his son. Whatever it was,
Narcissa was the better child in the long run.
But that alone did not mean Narcissa won in the end. She died eleven years later,
never having received the property.136 Her executors pursued the estate and litigation
was pending. 13 7 Peter Sweets had bought her half-brother's contingent interest in the
estate back in 1824 and might have been involved in the prosecution of the first case.138
He tried to buy Narcissa, but Dr. Elliot, her owner, refused to sell her, unless it was for
the purpose of freeing her. 13 9 Sweets and the curator of the estate, Thomas Wathan, then
signed an agreement with Elliot that they would pay him three hundred and fifty dollars
to emancipate her, if she would convey to them her entire interest in the testator's
estate. 140 Thus, in October of 1831, seven months after the first case was decided,
Narcissa became free. 14 1 She signed over the estate, having been told by Sweets and
Wathan that the estate was "insolvent, or not worth more than" the money they paid to
free her. 14 2 But she had been swindled. Sweets thereafter filed a bill for division of the
estate, claiming the personal estate was worth more than ten thousand dollars, and the
real estate, worth more than five thousand dollars. 143 By the date of the second lawsuit,
about fourteen hundred dollars of the personal estate was remaining and the real estate
was worth fifteen hundred dollars. 144
Chief Justice George Robertson criticized Sweets and Wathan. He criticized
Sweets for insinuating himself into the action for the purpose of stealing Narcissa's
130. Id. at 50.
131. Hubbard's Will, 29 Ky. at 50.
132. Id. at 59.
133. Id. at 59-60.
134. Id. at 60.
135. Id.
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Jones: Righteous Fathers, Vulnerable Old Men, and Degraded Creatures: So
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2004
720 TULSA LAW RE VIEW [Vol. 40:699
property, and Waltham, who had a fiduciary duty entrusted by Hubbard "to disclose to
Narcissa, frankly and explicitly, the situation of the estate and her potential interest in
it."' 14 5 There was no "rational doubt that they made a fraudulent use of their peculiar
knowledge and position, and unconscientiously deceived and imposed on an isolated
victim, who had not the ordinary means of rescue or resistance."' 14 6 Equity demanded
that the estate be audited and settled for the benefit of Narcissa's executors and trustees,
to purchase and emancipate the children to whom she gave birth while she was a
slave. 147
One can certainly make the argument that if Hubbard cared about his daughter so
much, he would have done all he could for her while he was alive, instead of leaving her
at the mercy of untrustworthy men who only sought to take advantage of her ignorance.
Perhaps he could have bought her freedom, rather than hoping that her freedom would be
bought after his death. Nonetheless, Justice Robertson and the other members of the
court of appeals did not hesitate to help her. The court in Arkansas was just as helpful to
another slave, a child who was three years old when her father died. 148 Duncan G.
Campbell made a will in 1845, giving his estate to his brother and sisters, after
"deducting therefrom five thousand dollars, which I bequeath to Viney, a yellow girl."
14 9
One of his sisters was to take care of her until she turned fifteen, when she was to
become free and receive her legacy. 150 He had no lawful issue, and Viney was his only
child. 
15 1
Instead of being cared for by her father's relatives, her uncle, Samuel Campbell,
executor of the estate, sold her in Missouri as a slave during the time of his
appointment. 152 He served as executor from October 1845 until he was removed for
breaches of trust in 1847.153 Cornelius Campbell took over as executor that July. 154 In
January 1848, Samuel Campbell brought the suit against Cornelius Campbell which
founded the basis of the action before the court. 155 Other claimants included his sisters
Mary and Flora Anne Campbell, and other siblings. 156 The purpose of the action was to
declare "the bequest to Viney and so much of the will as purported to emancipate her
were contrary to law and public policy, and void; and, notwithstanding the will, Viney
continued to be a slave and the property of the estate." 15 7 During the course of the trial,
everyone discovered what Samuel Campbell had done. 158 The court declared Viney to
145. Id. at 243.
146. Narcissa's Executors, 41 Ky. at 243.
147. Id.
148. Campbell, 13 Ark. at 517.
149. Id. at 516.
150. Id. at 516, 519.
151. Id. at 516.
152. Id. at 517.




157. Id. at 516-17.
158. Campbell, 13 Ark. at 517.
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be its ward, and "made a rule upon him to produce her by the next term." 159 Campbell,
failing to do this, was imprisoned in contempt. 16  The guardian appointed to represent
Viney in the action, "being directed by the court to ascertain where she was and reclaim
her... recovered possession of her by habeas corpus."
' 161
Through Cornelius Campbell's accounting, the court discovered that the estate was
not worth more than five thousand dollars, due apparently, to Samuel Campbell's
removal of assets and waste of the estate.162 This was the amount of money Viney was
supposed to receive, since it had always been Duncan Campbell's intent "as he had often
expressed during his lifetime, to liberate Viney."' 163 She answered in turn, claiming that
she was entitled to freedom and as much of the estate as would be required to provide her
legacy. 164 The lower court held in her favor, freeing her as per the will and finding that
the legacy vested in her immediately upon Duncan Campbell's death. 165 Cornelius
Campbell then became her guardian. 166 An appeal followed, and the Arkansas high
court affirmed. 167 The court believed that her father wished to free her immediately
upon his death, and that his behavior was reasonable:
Considering that Viney was the child of the testator, that she was of tender years, that it
was necessary, under our statute, for him to make some adequate provision for her support,
to prevent her from becoming a charge on the public, at the same time confiding the care
and custody of the child to one of his nearest relations ... the will appears to be as sensible
and judicious a one, albeit not technically framed, as any man in the unhappy condition of
the testator, could well have made. 
16 8
Nothing under Arkansas law barred Duncan Campbell from freeing her, and he followed
the state policy of preventing free people of color from becoming wards of the state, by
placing her under care and giving her a legacy worth more than the five hundred dollar
bond a free person immigrating to the state was required to provide, in addition to a
certificate of freedom, "conditioned for his good behavior, and to pay for his support, in
case he should, at any time thereafter, be unable to support himself."
' 169
The evidence in these cases indicates the extent to which the mixed-race children
of white slave owners could reach a certain level of privilege. Their mixed-race status
gave them access, not only through their fathers, but through their access to whites in the
community who protected their interests. Although they were slaves, they were able to
obtain freedom and property when their fathers embraced paternalism and when other
elite white men in the community--executors and justices hearing will contests-upheld
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id. (emphasis omitted).
162. Id.




167. Id. at 522.
168. Campbell, 13 Ark. at 519.
169. Id. at 520.
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those paternal inclinations. They became upwardly mobile, occupying a class status
different from other blacks who remained in bondage.
III. THE VULNERABLE OLD MEN: ENTHRALLED AND BAMBOOZLED
The "vulnerable old men," were testators who drafted wills giving freedom and
property to slave women and their children in cases where the undue influence
allegations of the challengers to the wills stuck-where the justices hearing the cases
found that the circumstances surrounding the legacy were suspicious. These were the
vulnerable old men who lived in isolation from white relatives and friends, and were
apparently in the thrall of women of color who controlled them. These women forced
them to act contrary to propriety's demands. The men thus did not leave money and
property to their white relatives; instead, they gave everything to the women and their
children.
Davis v. Calvert,170 a case heard by the Maryland Court of Appeals, is an example.
Thomas Cramphin of Montgomery County died at the age of ninety-two in December of
1830.171 A month later, Elizabeth Davis, his next of kin, filed an objection to the will
filed for probate by the executor, George Calvert. 172 She alleged George Calvert had
colluded with Caroline Calvert, his daughter and former slave, to defraud Cramphin of
his estate. 173 The probate court directed the matter to the county court for trial, where
Davis lost. 174 She then filed an appeal over various jury charges and objections to
evidence sustained by the county court.
1 7 5
Caroline Calvert became Cramphin's mistress when he was about seventy-five
years old. 176 During that time, she remained George Calvert's slave and had eleven
children, one of whom died.177 She received her freedom two days before the will was
made in 1824, when Cramphin was eighty-five or eighty-six. 178 Clauses in the will
provided for her manumission and the gradual emancipation of seven of her children. 
179
Those seven children received bequests under the will.180 None of the others-the three
born after her manumission-received anything. 181 She and the children were to receive
what Justice John Buchanan of the appellate court described as a considerable estate.
182
George Calvert would receive the estate if any of the bequests to Caroline and her
children failed. 
183
170. 5 G. & J. 269.
171. Id. at 273.
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 271-78.
175. Davis, 5 G. & J. at 278.




180. Davis, 5 G. & J. at 306.
181. Id.
182. Id. at 308.
183. Id. at 306-07.
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Caroline Calvert claimed that she had been Cramphin's mistress and companion
for all the years she had been with him. 184 She was a loyal and faithful servant. 185 She
took care of him and supervised his household. 186 The children were his, and he
recognized them as such.18 7 Davis replied that Caroline Calvert had been a prostitute the
entire time she lived with Cramphin, and that none of the children were his. 188 Davis
had witnesses whose testimony she claimed would prove that Calvert bamboozled
Cramphin and exercised undue influence upon a frail old man who was incapable of
having children. 189 Other witnesses would testify that George Calvert, a few days after
Cramphin's death, "had promised... to provide for the children, yet that he did not
consider himself bound to do so, because they were not [Cramphin's] .... " 190 The trial
court sustained the Calverts's objections to the evidence Davis proposed; Davis lost, but
the appeals court reversed and remanded for a new trial. 191
Justice Buchanan was quite suspicious, because of Cramphin's age and the drafting
of a will that left everything to a newly-manumitted slave and some, but not all, of the
children she allegedly had by the testator. 192 It seemed that George Calvert, apparently a
trusted friend of the testator, had helped perpetrate a fraud, one that had the potential to
benefit him, since he could also recover under the will. 193 The justices thus held that the
evidence Davis proposed could be important for determining the circumstances of
Cramphin's life and the making of the will. 194 Caroline Calvert's character evidence
was important, therefore it was all admissible. 
195
At the remand, the nature of the evidence the court held could be admitted might
very well have led to Elizabeth Davis winning the second time around. She could
present all kinds of witnesses, presumably white men, who would testify that Caroline
Davis was a prostitute, and in a regime where black women were deemed without virtue,
it is certainly possible that they would have been seen as credible. Slaves in general
could not testify, but Caroline Calvert was no longer a slave at the time the action began
in 1831. As a party to the action, she was capable of testifying. One wonders, however,
whether she would have been believed.
But the woman alleged to have wielded the undue influence need not have
colluded with others. In another case, the relatives of Edmund Talbot, an elderly white
man debilitated by old age, alleged that a free black woman in his house had made him
leave everything in his will to her, to the exclusion of his own children "whose condition
184. Id. at 276.
185. Davis, 5 G. & J. at 276.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 274.
188. Id.
189. Id.
190. Davis, 5 G. & J. at 307.
191. Id. at 313.
192. Id. at 309, 312-13.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 313.
195. Davis, 5 G. & J. at 313.
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and circumstances in life, required the exercise of his bounty in their favor . ,,196
Justice James Simpson explained:
[He seemed] to have had no will of his own, but to have submitted implicitly to the
dictation of a colored woman whom he had emancipated, and whose familiar intercourse
with him, had brought him into complete and continued subjection to her influence. The
very fact, that he undisguisedly yielded to an influence of such a character, and lost, under
its exercise, apparently all independence of thought and action, leads irresistibly to the197
conclusion, that his mental faculties had given away ....
Thus, the court held, Talbot did not have the mental capacity to make a valid will, and
the will was rejected. 19 8
Also worthy of protection were those testators threatened by their legitimate white
children for recognizing their illegitimate mixed-race offspring. Loyd Ford of
Washington County, Tennessee, made a will in 1840 directing that John Ford and other
slaves be emancipated and given real property. 199  They were alleged to be his
illegitimate slave children.2 0 He named his legitimate sons, James and Grant Ford, as
executors. 20 1 They refused to serve, and the slaves brought an action by their friend
Phebe Stuart to have the will probated.20 2 Some of the distributees and heirs at law then
appeared and contested the will. 2° 3 The lower court found that the will was valid, and an
appeal followed.20 4
The opponents to the will alleged that Loyd Ford was of unsound mind, an elderly
man with a failing memory. 205 But notwithstanding his advancing years, Justice Nathan
Green, in writing for the court, found he was still capable of disposing of his property.
20 6
The jury was entitled to hear and weigh evidence of his reputation and the nature of the
relationship he had with the slaves. 207 Ford had been heard to recognize them as his
children, and the evidence corroborated it.20 8 There was no reason to believe he was
insane. 20 9 That he once told the keeper of the will to bum it, only to ask about it a few
days later, did not necessarily mean insanity.2 10  Witnesses claimed that Ford
complained that one of his legitimate sons "threatened to beat him, if he did not come
and get the will .... [Sarah Hale, R.G.'s wife,] brought a paper which, by the old man's
direction, was thrown in the fire.... The paper thrown into the fire was not the
196. Denton, 48 Ky. at 30.
197. Id.
198. Id. at 31.





204. Ford, 26 Tenn. at 93.
205. Id. at 97.
206. Id.
207. Id. at 98-99.
208. Id.
209. Ford, 26 Tenn. at 99.
210. Id. at 102-03.
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will ... .,,211 Instead of being insane, Ford could have been wily, dissembling to avoid
conflict with his son: "Some days afterwards the testator was at Hale's house, and
enquired of Sarah Hale. .. if she had his will yet; she told him she had. He then said she
must keep it, and do what he had before told her to do with it."
2 12
Justice Green thought that it was appropriate for evidence to be heard on the nature
of the relationship between Ford and his mixed-race children. 2 13 Such evidence would
establish whether Talbot was sane.2 14 In noting that the slaves had the right to bring
their action, Justice Green set forth a remarkably liberal disquisition on the personhood
of slaves:
A slave is not in the condition of a horse or an ox. His liberty is restrained, it is true, and
his owner controls his actions and claims his services. But he is made after the image of
the Creator. He has mental capacities, and an immortal principle in his nature, that
constitute him equal to his owner but for the accidental position in which fortune has
placed him. The owner has acquired conventional rights to him, but the laws under which
he is held as a slave have not and cannot extinguish his high-born nature nor deprive him
of many rights which are inherent in man.
215
Wiethoff notes, however, that Justice Green's apparent liberalism was not
consistent. Green also thought slaves were "unfortunate, degraded, and vicious.
216
Beyond that, free blacks were "an inferior caste in society, with whom public opinion
has never permitted the white population to associate on terms of equality, and in relation
to whom the laws have never allowed the enjoyment of equal rights. ' 2 17 This was the
same Justice Green who held for William Isaac Rawlings. 2 18 Green's contradictions
mean that he arguably was not a great supporter of black rights. Nonetheless, he did not
seem troubled by the existence of Ford's mixed-race children. He might have been
troubled, however, by adult children abusing their elderly father in an attempt to make
him change his will. Finding Ford insane just on the bare facts of a will leaving property
to slaves, without any further inquiry, would have left open the door for the unscrupulous
to take advantage of old men and deny them their personal freedom and autonomy.
IV. THE DEGRADED CREATURES: LACKING MORAL FIBER AND
LIVING BEYOND THE PALE
In some jurisdictions where justices frowned upon interracial liaisons, they felt
constrained to fulfill the testator's interests, nonetheless. These men were the "degraded
creatures" who recognized their slave women partners and their children. The will
211. Id. at 102. Note, however, that one earlier commentator has read the language of "children" to mean
the paternalistic language of a slave master for his figurative, but not literal, slave "children." Arthur F.
Howington, "Not in the Condition of a Horse or an Ox": Ford v. Ford, the Law of Testamentary Manumission,
and the Tennessee Courts' Recognition of Slave Humanity, 34 Tenn. Hist. Q. 249 (1975).
212. Ford, 26 Tenn. at 102-103.
213. Id. at 98-99.
214. Id. at 99.
215. Id. at 95-96.
216. Wiethoff, supran. 16, at 46.
217. Ford, 26 Tenn. at 97.
218. Greenlow, 22 Tenn. 90; see supra nn. 105-119 and accompanying text.
2005]
27
Jones: Righteous Fathers, Vulnerable Old Men, and Degraded Creatures: So
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2004
TULSA LAW REVIEW
contests in these cases illuminate the extent to which these were battles over social
control. Elite white men who flouted society's mores by living openly with black
women and recognizing their children could not be controlled. But their children and the
children's mothers could be, insofar as they could be punished for the testator's illicit
behavior. Thus, the will contest was to some extent motivated by those seeking to
malign him and usurp his prerogatives.
This meant that claimants, for example, the brothers and sisters of Ephraim Pool of
Alabama, played upon community prejudices and proposed legal presumptions that Pool
was incapable of making a will.2 19 The proponents of the will would then have had the
difficult burden of disproving the presumption, and if the presumption stuck, the jury
would be forced to see the facts through its light, and the will could be held invalid as a
matter of law. Pool directed his executor, George L. Stewart, to take "Harriet, a mulatto
woman, and several children of another woman, who were principally raised by [the
first], and whose father the testator appears to have been," to Ohio. 220 They were to be
emancipated, his estate liquidated in its entirety, and all of the money invested on their
behalf.22 1 Harriet was to control the money.
222
So what did his siblings hope the jury would presume? The siblings hoped that the
will would be seen as unnatural and that it was written due solely to Harriet's
inducement and influence. 223  Ephraim and Harriet's relationship was an undue
attachment, an adulterous connection, and his siblings righteously refused to associate
with him as a result, but that should not bar them from receiving his property. 224 They
argued that "Pool made his will out of spite," and "was acting under such an insane
delusion as to his brothers and sisters."22 5 Moreover, Harriet might have induced the
prejudice that caused him to leave her and the children all his property.2 26 But the
presumption did not stick. The trial court did not permit it, and the high court
reaffirmed.227
Men like Pool were privileged by race and class, living their lives how they
pleased, and leaving their property as they saw fit, to the chagrin of not only their
families, but also the justices who were critical of their behavior. Notwithstanding their
disgust, the justices thought they could not do a thing about it. As elite white men, they
could quarrel with the behavior, but the very hallmark of liberty meant that a man could
do with his property as he wished. These battles sometimes amounted to fights within
the courts themselves, between justices who were chagrined, and those who in various
instances had been instrumental in helping these men draft their wills. In the view of the
hardliners, these testators contributed to that ancient anathema: a population of free
blacks privileged by their intimate ties to white men.
219. Pool's Heirs, 33 Ala. at 145.
220. Id. at 146.
221. Id. at 145.
222. Id. at 146.
223. Id. at 147.
224. Pool's Heirs v. Pool's Executor, 35 Ala. 12, 14 (1859).
225. Id. at 14.
226. Id. at 15.
227. Id. at 19.
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W.B. Farr of South Carolina was sixty-six years old when he died in 1837. 228 He
made a will in 1836, and added a codicil in 1837. 229 In the will, he gave his entire
estate, worth fifty to sixty thousand dollars, to W.P. Thompson, his executor. 23° Farr
had never married, but according to the record "had lived for many years in a state of
illicit intercourse with a mulatto woman, his own slave, who assumed the position of a
wife, and controlled, at least, all the domestic arrangements of his family." 23 1 Her name
was Fan, and she was described as "bright mulatto. " 232 She and Farr had one child,
Henry. 233 Henry, apparently, was "nearly white." 234 Years before Farr died, he tried to
free Henry by applying to the legislature, the only method of manumission available
under statutory law, but that effort failed. 235 Thus, when Henry came of age, his father
sent him to Indiana, "where he had him settled, and provided him, from time to time,
with considerable sums of money."
236
The will in question was exactly like the one Judge John B. O'Neall had written
for him back in 1828.237 Judge O'Neall was not on the South Carolina Court of Appeals
at the time. 238 In the 1836 will, Thompson, not O'Neall, was the executor. 239 In each
case, Farr gave written instructions to the executor, declaring a trust relationship,
explaining that the property should be "execute[d] for the benefit of Fan and Henry."
240
Those contesting the will were Farr's half-brothers, nephews, and nieces. 24 1  By
claiming that the will was invalid due to the undue influence of Fan, they hoped to
convince the court that Farr died intestate, in which case they would inherit. 242 In their
view, Farr was under Fan's control, because she wielded the power of "a white woman
,,243 244
and a wife. Farr consulted with her, and did what she said. Yet, they alleged, it
was possible he was afraid of her, becoming so as he got older, because hard drinking
and "a stroke of the palsy" had debilitated him.2 45 They said she was also a drinker, and
when she was under the influence, she used to become particularly insolent, which
included acts of insulting and threatening him.246 According to one witness, "he did not
know why he took up with [her]; when he was well and could go about, he did not mind
228. Farr, Cheves 37 at 37.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 37-38.
231. Id. at38.
232. Id.




237. Id. at 39-40.
238. Farr, Cheves 37 at 39-40.
239. Id. at 39.
240. Id. at 40.
241. ld. at 38.
242. Id. at 37-38.
243. Farr, Cheves 37 at 41.
244. Id.
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her, but since he had been palsied, he had better be in hell." 247 The jury in the lower
court found against the will.
248
By the time of the appeal, Judge O'Neall was on the high court, but he recused
himself.249  Justice Baylis J. Earle delivered the opinion of the court, making an
interesting comment on the undue influence allegation that was at the heart of so many of
these types of will contests: "This phrase of undue influence, so frequently resorted to in
this country, by disappointed relations, to avoid wills of persons on whom, while living,
they had no claims, seems to me to be a modem innovation, and is not known in the
English Courts." 25° The litigation instituted by these claimants had no basis. In his
view, any reasonable and sane person could make a will, for the law permitted disposal
of property at death, just as though the transfer took place while the person was alive.2
5 1
Thus, he explained:
The testator was an intelligent man, of strong mind .... He had no lawful wife, nor
children, and had not lived in amity, at least not in continued amity, with his relations; and
he has given his property to a stranger to his blood. This he surely had a right to do, and
this is all that appears upon the face of the will.
252
Notwithstanding Farr's long-term relationship with Fan, the social and legal
culture did not accord her the status of a relation, and if Fan had been his lawful wife and
wielded the same level of influence "it would not hold either with reason or law, to say
that such an influence would avoid a will in behalf of the wife."2 53 Fan was vulnerable
only because she was a black woman and a slave. The undue influence alleged by the
heirs at law did not hold, however, because the court took a very narrow view of what
coercion meant. 254 The external threat or compulsion had to have existed at the exact
moment when the will was written in 1836, and the court found none. 255 But beyond
that, the will of 1828 was identical to the one at issue, and the evidence supporting the
allegations of influence took place a few years afterwards, in 1835.256 No matter how
degrading the court found Farr's behavior, it was not unreasonable for Farr to provide for
his son Henry, and to hold otherwise:
[W]ould be, to let the jury run wild under the influence of prejudices and feelings which,
however honorable and praiseworthy, must not be permitted to overthrow the rules of law,
or divert the current of justice. The trial by jury would otherwise become an engine of
capricious injustice, instead of the safe-guard of property. 25 7
This safeguarding of property was what the testators in all instances were trying to
do. They wanted to make provision for the women and their children, under a regime
247. Id. at 42.
248. Farr, Cheves 37 at 42.
249. Id. at 49.
250. Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
251. Id. at 47.
252. Id.
253. Farr, Cheves 37 at 48.
254. Id. at 48-49.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Id. at 49.
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hostile to such a purpose. The law and culture of public opinion denied them, but they
could try through arrangements with trusted friends and relatives charged with seeing the
task through. But nothing was more effective than making sure the manumissions took
place before death. This was what Elijah Willis did.25 8 In 1846, he made a will in South
Carolina.259 An unmarried man of about fifty-three years of age, he left his property to
members of his extended family: his siblings and their children. 260 Eight years later,
Willis went to Ohio and had another will made by lawyers there. 261 By this time, his
circumstances changed; there were other people he wanted to make arrangements for, but
he could not do what he wanted in South Carolina.262 He directed his executors to take
Amy (his slave mistress), her children and her mother, to Cincinnati and emancipate
them there. 263 Everything in South Carolina-all his real and personal property-was to
be liquidated.264 All the proceeds were to go towards the purchase of land and the
furnishing of a home for Amy and the children. 265 They were to get the remainder of the
money.
266
A year later, in May of 1855, Willis left his home in South Carolina and set off for
267 268Ohio.2 67 Accompanying him were Amy, her seven children, and her mother. But
once they got off the steamboat, "[Willis] died between the landing and a hack [he hired
to take him] to his lodgings."2 69 The Ohio will was in his belongings; it was probated on
May 23, 1855, and the South Carolina will was probated some time thereafter, once
those back home learned of his death.270 The heirs at law filed their bill opposing the
Ohio will, claiming insanity, fraud, and undue influence, alleging facts similar to those
alleged in the case of Farr.
2 7 1
Judge O'Neall heard the case at the trial level, and the jury found against the
will.272 According to claimants' witnesses, "the deceased was often under gloomy
depression of spirits-avoiding society on account of his connection with Amy, by
whom he had several children; that he permitted her to act as the mistress of his
273 274house." She was demanding and outspoken, and an alcoholic. She might have
been unfaithful, yet was always careful to look out for herself and her children, at his
expense.2 75 But another witness explained that:




262. Id. at 186-87.
263. Jolliffe, 10 Rich. at 188.
264. Id. at 188-89.
265. Id. at 189.
266. Id.
267. Id. at 186.
268. Jolliffe, 10 Rich. at 186.
269. Id. at 187.
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. at 186, 193.
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[H]e was always anxious to secure the freedom of, and make provision for, Amy, and her
children by him. . . . [The witness] never thought any of the matters ... affected his
intellect. I thought there was not the slightest ground to say that the testator was not of
sane mind, or that there was fraud or undue influence.
276
The high court agreed and held that "the will was made in Cincinnati in the absence of
Amy, more than a year before the testator's death, a copy retained by him during the
whole time ... "277
That Willis made a new will in Ohio appeared to vitiate any allegations of
illegality under an act of 1841 that barred manumission within the state.278 The sole
279question for the court was whether the will was valid. Willis freed Amy, her children,
and her mother, and fulfilled the terms of the will.280 He "carried said slaves to Ohio in
his lifetime, there left them, and there they remain, so far as we know.'281 It was in his
right to do so, said Justice Thomas J. Withers. 282 Contrary to being insane or under
undue influence, Willis indicated that he had made a careful manumission plan for Amy
and her family, and this was done of his own free will and reasonable mind.2 83 Willis
conferred with Ohio lawyers, because he would not have been able to find anyone in
South Carolina to help him.284 Notwithstanding the disgust most felt, men like Willis
were to be pitied because "such motives and such provisions and such objects of bounty
were perfectly consistent with the unconstrained pleasure and natural sentiments of such
a man as Elijah Willis was." 285  His apparent moodiness and depression could be
explained as such:
[A] sigh when he beheld the living examples of his shame ... it is most obvious that the
more rational his reflections and forecast, when he contemplated the channel through
which he must hand down his blood to posterity, and the probable fortune of those who had
sprung from him, the deeper must have been his gloom, the more bitter his remorse.
286
But none of that meant insanity. The court ordered a new trial, and the verdict was in
favor of the Ohio will.
287
V. FORMALISM: SLAVERY, FREEDOM, AND THE RULE OF LAW
Considering that legal thinkers of the antebellum South viewed slavery as fulfilling
natural law and upholding the natural order of society, 288 it is only logical that they
276. Id.
277. Id. at 199-200.
278. Jolliffe, 10 Rich. at 187-88.
279. Id. at 192.
280. Id. at 195.
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Jolliffe, 10 Rich. at 200.
284. Id. at 200-01.
285. Id. at 200.
286. Id. at 201.
287. Id.
288. For examples, see various intellectual histories of nineteenth century American law, including Stephen
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upheld formalism, described by strict adherence to the law of slavery as established by
local legislation and case law, in pursuit of the ultimate social policy goal: preventing an
increase in the free black population. These justices were deeply suspicious of wills that
appeared to manumit slaves within Southern states and grant them privileges, such as
property and status as free people. 2 89 But formalism could be a two-edged sword.
Justices like O'Neall, who appeared to be less suspicious of testators' actions, could find
in the wills requirements that fulfilled the demands of the law of slavery: a master
charged with control over a slave.
Decisions from North Carolina indicate that the courts were called upon to hear
trusts set up for favored slaves, used when the law of the state prohibited manumission.
The testators hoped to give the slaves the status of free people, even though they
remained in bondage, a troubling concept to the appellate justices who heard the cases.
Thomas Cunningham of Wilmington stated in his will that a negro woman named Rachel
would be given land and the rental incomes on various properties he owned, all for her
benefit and for "the maintenance and education of her three mulatto children, named
Mary, Ritty and Chrissy, and the child of which she is now pregnant."2 90 He desired that
several other slaves-Virgil, Quash, and Tamer-should remain on the plantation where
he resided "to work for the maintenance of Rachel's children during the natural life of
the said negroes." 29 1 Finally, Rachel and her children were to become free immediately
upon his death.
2 92
Dr. Umstead of Orange County tried to do something similar in his will. He died
in 1829, and in his will gave a negro slave, Dicey, and her two children, Emeline and
Harriet, to his friends Catlett Campbell and Thomas D. Bennehan.293 They were the
executors charged with undertaking "the necessary legal steps, to have said slave Dicey
and her two children manumitted and liberated."2 94 Until they were manumitted, "the
labour of such slaves, and the profits, and proceeds thereof, shall enure ... to the benefit
of no other person whatever." 295 In 1829, Campbell and Bennehan filed a petition for
the slaves' emancipation; however, only Dicey became free. 2 9 6 When Catlett Campbell
died in 1845, he asked that Bennehan remain true to the trust established by Dr.
Umstead.29 7 He then relinquished any rights he had to the slaves, giving them to
Bennehan.298 He did not want the children or their descendants to become part of his
estate. Instead, he hoped they would gain their freedom, through some other trust
arrangement, provided it were necessary "to enable [Bennehan] to accomplish this
289. For example, see Joseph Lumpkin's opinions in Vance v. Crawford and Bryan v. Walton, infra nn. 390-
394 and accompanying text.
290. Cunningham's Heirs, 1 N.C. at 519.
291. Id.
292. Id.
293. Bennehan's Executor, 40 N.C. at 106.
294. Id.
295. Id.
296. Id. at 107.
297. Id.
298. Bennehan's Executor, 40 N.C. at 107.
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purpose, if such release is necessary, or to sell, or to convey them to any other person or
persons, for a nominal price."
299
In each case, the North Carolina Supreme Court found the trust was illegal. Slaves
were not competent to take property, as in the case of Cunningham's will. According to
Justice John Louis Taylor, "a civil incapacity results from the nature and condition of
slavery. And it would be a solecism, that the law should sanction or permit the
acquisition of property by those, from whom it afterwards withholds that protection
without which property is useless."300 Beyond that, permitting a slave to live as a free
person, as Dr. Umstead had planned for Dicey and the children, was illegal. 30 1 The
executors, as residuary legatees, received the slaves outright.302  Thus, the slaves
Campbell owned that came from Dr. Umstead were considered part of his estate, subject
to its debts.
30 3
William S. Morris attempted to manumit a slave named Patsy and her three
children: Harriet, Albert, and Freeman. 30 4 But the steps he took amounted to what the
court found was an illegal attempt to free them and have them remain in the state. 30 5 In
1831, Morris made up his will in which he gave Patsy and the children to his executor
for the purpose of freeing them within a year of his death, using all money remaining in
the estate "to effect the removal and emancipation as aforesaid," and to provide for their
education, improvement, and subsistence. 306 Seven years later, Morris added a codicil
that devised them land, household effects, his cow and calf, and ten shares of stock in the
Merchant's Bank at Newbern. 30 7 Patsy was to use and occupy the property. 30 8 After
she died, the children were to get it.309 Other pieces of land were to be sold for the
benefit of William Henry Morris, Harriet's son and Patsy's grandson, who was to receive
one thousand dollars out of the sale. 31 William S. Morris died in 1848, and his next of
kin and various other legatees brought suit to declare the emancipations and legacies to
Patsy, her children, and grandchild, void.31 1
Significant to the court's opinion was the fact that in 1828, Morris had brought
Patsy and her three children to Pennsylvania for the purpose of emancipating them, only
to bring them back to North Carolina on his return, where they lived as free people.
3 12
Interestingly enough, Justice William Gaston, who was sitting on the North Carolina
Supreme Court at the time, had explained to him that the emancipation was irregular and
299. Id.
300. Cunningham's Heirs, 1 N.C. at 521.
301. Bennehan's Executor, 40 N.C. at 108-09.
302. Id. at 109.
303. Id. at 109-10.
304. Green, 45 N.C. at 102.
305. Id. at 107.
306. Id. at 103.
307. Id.
308. Id.
309. Green, 45 N.C. at 103.
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 104.
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might be declared void upon his death, thus advising Morris to make up the will.
3 13
Thereafter, the executors tried to effectuate the slaves' freedom by taking them back to
Pennsylvania with the intent that they would live there permanently. 3 14 But the will held
a contradiction. Judge Battle asked: How could Patsy and the others live in
Pennsylvania, when according to Morris, they were to occupy and hold property in North
Carolina? It was obvious that Morris intended North Carolina to be their place of
residence, and the lower court thus held that the codicil of 1838 was contrary to state law
and "the negroes Patsy, Harriet, Freeman and William Henry Morris, were still slaves,
and belonged to the estate of said testator."3 15  The Supreme Court agreed, and
dismissed a petition for a rehearing, affirming the decree of the lower court.
3 16
In another case, Lucy Thomas was more successful at gaining her freedom. But
due to a contradiction between the terms of the will and a codicil, she was not able to
gain the property Nathaniel P. Thomas left for her and her children, Mary Jane, James,
and Newton. 3 17 Nathaniel intended that two plots of land in Caswell County, totaling
151 acres, be sold by his executors, and the proceeds be used to purchase a suitable home
for Lucy and her children, with the remainder placed in an interest-bearing account.
318
The interest was to be used for their support, but before the sale took place, the estate
would provide funds for them to live on.3 19 In a codicil, Thomas included a clause he
hoped would save the bequests to them in case North Carolina law:
[S]hall present any obstacle to the fulfillment of the trust ... in relation to my mulatto
woman, Lucy, and her children, I do hereby authorize and direct my executor, to send them
to such State, territory or country as she may select, and he may think best, and I do hereby
charge my estate with a sum sufficient to provide for their removal ... and for their
comfortable settlement there; it being my will and desire that she shall not be continued in
slavery. 3
20
Once Lucy learned that she could not remain in North Carolina and receive the
bequests under the will, she moved with the children to Ohio and became free.321 Ohio
became their domicile. 322  She then brought suit in North Carolina, explaining that
through her own efforts and that of the executor, Nathaniel J. Palmer, they were able to
get to Ohio, but she complained that "they [had] not been provided with a home or
settlement as the will directs, and that they are in want and destitution, and that the
children being small, the mother is unable to support herself and them, without the
assistance of the fund ',rovided in the will."'323 She wanted the fifteen hundred dollars of
313. For a discussion of Judge Gaston's career and opinions on slavery, indicating a humanistic perspective
on slavery, stemming from religious conviction, see Wiethoff, supra n. 16, at 87. Gaston served on the court
from 1834-1844, but was not on the court when Green v. Lane was decided in 1852.
314. Green, 45 N.C. at 104.
315, Id. at 112.
316, Id. at 116.
317. Thomas, 54 N.C. at 250.
318. Id. at 249-50.
319. Id. at250.
320. Id.
321. Id. at 250-55.




Jones: Righteous Fathers, Vulnerable Old Men, and Degraded Creatures: So
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2004
TULSA LA W RE VIEW
proceeds from the sale of the properties, the expenses for her move to Ohio, and the costs
of their resettlement.
324
Palmer replied that according to his advisors, nothing in the codicil validated what
were "deficient and illegal devises in the body of the will, so that the plaintiffs [were] not
entitled to anything but the expenses of their removal and a comfortable settlement"
325
in Ohio. He already gave them the money to assist in their move, and intended to
provide for their comfortable settlement there, but he was waiting for what the court
would say.326 Justice Richmond M. Pearson, however, read the will and codicil in
narrow terms, viewing the will void, insofar as it would have given Lucy and her
children nominal slave status. 327 They would have had special housing and funding for
their support.32 8 To have permitted such a state of affairs would have fueled discontent
among other slaves who knew them: "Free negroes constitute a distinct class; and the
poor creatures seldom prosper so well as to become objects of envy." 329 Thus, all those
becoming free were to leave the state, which was what Lucy did.330 But the codicil did
not make the terms written in the will valid and did not authorize Lucy and her children
to receive the fund provided by the sale of the land.33 1 Although Pearson intended the
332
codicil to be a substitute for the will, in case the will was held invalid, Lucy could
receive from the estate only the costs to cover her move and settlement in Ohio, and not
any income for the maintenance of her and her children.
333
But in South Carolina, Justice John B. O'Neall was more open to such trust
arrangements. Considering a case with a fact pattern almost identical to that in the case
of Thomas Cunningham's will, he found that the assignment John Carmille made in
1830 of various slaves as part of a trust arrangement was proper.334  The trustees,
George Pringle and Philip Chartrand, paid nominal consideration, and received deeds for
the slaves.335 The contract permitted the slaves-a woman named Henrietta and her five
children: Charlotte, Francis, Nancy, John, and Elizabeth to seek their own employment,
work for their own maintenance, and exercise control over their earnings.336 They were
to pay the trustees the sum of one dollar per year. 337 Two other slaves, Tilly and Mary,
were to apply their labor for the benefit of Henrietta and her children.
338
It is quite telling that in 1832, Carmille made a will in which he left his entire
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without, according to the law. 339 That will was rejected, however, because apparently
Carmille had been married in 1830 to Margaret Amott, with whom he lived for ten
months, until she died. 34  Julia Carmille, claiming right as their daughter, was the
complainant in the instant case. 34 1 John Carmille died in 1833, and his daughter claimed
that Henrietta and her children should be considered part of his estate: "The object of this
bill is to set aside those deeds, and subject the slaves, in the first place, to the payment of
the debts of the intestate, and to have the surplus paid or delivered to the complainant, as
next of kin."
34 2
Significant to the case was whether the assignment to Pringle and Chartrand was
designed to contravene the 1820 Act which declared "that no slave shall hereafter be
emancipated but by the Act of the Legislature." 34 3 But O'Neall did not see this case as
violating any law: the slaves were not emancipated at all, insofar as they still had
masters, and it did not matter that Pringle and Chartrand were to give them the fruits of
their own labor.344 O'Neal stated that "[k]indness to slaves, according to my judgment,
is the true policy of slave owners, and its spirit should go ... into the making of the law,
and ought to be a ruling principle of its construction. Nothing will more assuredly defeat
our institution of slavery, than harsh legislation rigorously enforced. ' 34 5 The purpose of
the contract was not to free Henrietta and her children, but to ensure that they would
have kind masters upon Carmille's death.
346
In these cases, it appears the trusts could stand because there was a deed that
conveyed ownership to another, and the slaves in question could not sue to enforce the
trust. The very ownership was transferred, with the effect of placing the actions of the
trustees beyond the reach of the claimants alleging illegality and improper possession of
their testator's property. The testator gave up all claim to the slaves. Yet, under the law,
the trustees could do what they wanted, for they were owners in control of slaves. That
meant in theory, they could violate the trust arrangement, and the slaves would lose as a
result because "the beneficiaries being slaves could have no standing in Court to compel
the execution of the trusts, which were thus of imperfect obligation, depending upon the
benevolence of the trustee."
347
But in 1841, the legislature put an end to the practice. According to Justice David
L. Wardlaw, "the policy of the State announced in the Act of 1841 ... inhibit[ed] the
practical emancipation of slaves, and gifts and trusts for their benefit." 34 8 Thus, the trust
William Hacket set up for the benefit of his slave Mary, their child Louisa, and her
mother Alsey was found illegal.34 9 Hacket died in 1850 after having drafted his will in
339. Carmille, 2 McMul. at 454.
340. Id. at 454-55.
341. Id. at 454.
342. Id. at 455.
343. Id. at 468.
344. Carmille, 2 McMul. at 470.
345. Id.
346. Id.
347. Broughton, 3 Rich. Eq. at 438.
348. Mallet, 6 Rich. Eq. at 20.
349. Id. at 12, 20.
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1847.350 In the fourth clause of the document, he gave the slaves to his brother, Hugh,
and directed that he settle them on a designated piece of land and build them a house.
35 1
The slaves were to receive all the profits of the land, interest income on one thousand
dollars, and the hire of one of the other slaves, Dick.3 52 They were to live as free people,
"without any person'requiring or exacting any service or labor from [them]." 353 If any
of the legatees to the will complained of the terms, the executors were directed to revoke
the legacy of the complainant.
354
William Hacket's sister Jane Mallet filed suit on the ground that the clauses for the
benefit of Mary and her family were void under law.3 55 Her brother Hugh responded
that in keeping with the terms of William's will, she forfeited the two thousand dollars
she was to receive, as well as her interest in the residue of the estate.3 56 The court sided
with her.35 7 The purpose of the clause was to terrorize.358 To permit it to stand would
have meant that legitimate legal issues at stake would not be resolved. 359 According to
Justice Wardlaw, the Act of 1841 established that the bequests William made were
void as against public policy .... In the proper construction of the will, we must consider
the fourth clause as struck out .... Besides, the legatees supposed to be disappointed here,
are slaves, who have no civil rights or status in Courts, through which they might assert a
claim for compensation.
360
That the formal rule of slavery presumed every black person a slave, meant that a
free person of color bringing suit could be accused of being a slave and incapable of
receiving a legacy. Thomas Hamilton of Davidson County, Tennessee took out a five
thousand dollar life insurance policy with the Mutual Protection Insurance Company on
April 2, 1849.361 In August, he wrote into the policy that he was making the policy over
to Adelaide Eliza Goram, a free woman of color from New Orleans. 362 In February of
1850, he was in New Orleans and had the endorsement witnessed into the policy.363 He
died five years later on August 25, 1855. 3 6 4  Shortly thereafter, Goram went to the
insurance company's office to cash it.365 Andrew Hamilton, who became the executor
of Thomas Hamilton's estate, also claimed the policy, arguing that the estate might be
insolvent and the money would be needed to pay the debts. 366 The insurance company
350. Id. at 12.
351. Id. at 12-13.
352. Id. at 13.
353. Mallet, 6 Rich. Eq. at 13.
354. Id.
355. Id.
356. Id. at 14.
357. ld. at 25.
358. Mallet, 6 Rich. Eq. at 25.
359. Id.
360. Id. (emphasis added).
361. Mutual Protection Ins. Co., 37 Tenn. at 270.
362. Id.
363. ld. at270-71.
364. Id. at 271.
365. Id
366. Mutual Protection Ins. Co., 37 Tenn. at 271.
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brought suit to determine who should receive the money.367 The case was heard by the
Tennessee Supreme Court in Nashville.
368
Goram proved that Thomas Hamilton gave her the policy once he finalized the
assignment and that it had been in her possession since then.369 Andrew Hamilton
responded that the assignment was not done in proper procedure, with notice given to the
insurance company.3 70 But more significantly, he did not believe that Goram was a free
person "capable in law, of taking any interest under the assignment." 37 1 Justice Robert
J. McKinney, writing on behalf of the court, held that there was nothing in the insurance
contract that required Thomas to inform the insurance company of what he had done.
372
Moreover, once he made the assignment, it had the effect of "divesting the assured of all
interest in, and power of disposition over the policy." 373 Goram thus gained absolute
right to it. She had gone to the insurer's office, demanding payment, claiming her right
as a free woman to do so, but the company's agent did not believe her.374 The court
refused to permit Goram's status as a free woman to become an issue for litigation:
These incidental allusions to the status of the defendant, were scarcely sufficient perhaps,
to have called for an answer, touching her social condition; much less to have put her upon
proof in relation to it; yet she does not answer as to this matter, and denying the right to
raise any such question against her, she avers that she is a free woman, capable in law of
taking and holding property, and of suing and being sued. And there being no proof upon
this point, the objection must of course fall.37 5
Adelaide Goram was a free person who was making a claim for an insurance
policy, and her case was heard by a court that tended to be more liberal. But courts in
Georgia and Mississippi tended to be more formalist in favor of slavery, particularly with
respect to manumission taking place anywhere in the state. But when manumission took
place elsewhere, the testators' intentions were more likely to be upheld. When Reuben
B. Patterson set forth clearly that he entrusted George D. Blakely to become guardian to
a three-year-old colored girl, Sophy, and remove her from the state of Georgia and free
her, it was legal under Georgia law. 376  Sophy was the daughter of his woman,
Margaret.3 77  He did not want the little girl to be considered part of his estate.
378
Instead, she was to be educated and remain in Blakely's care until she reached the age of
sixteen, or until she married with his consent. 379  She was to receive two thousand
dollars, the interest to be used for her education and support.3 80 If she were to marry,
367. Id.
368. Id. at 269.
369. Id. at 271.
370. Id. at 272.
371. Mutual Protection Ins. Co., 37 Tenn. at 272.
372. Id. at 273.
373. Id. at 275.
374. Id. at 278.
375. Id. (emphasis omitted).
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Blakely was to buy her a homestead. 38 1 Blakely sued the executor, Alexander Cooper,
in order to fulfill the terms of Patterson's will.382 Cooper claimed the terms were invalid
and void as contravening the laws against manumission of slaves. 383 The lower court
held for Blakely, and Cooper appealed. 384 Justice Robert Iverson replied that the will
did not violate the law.
385
Although Georgia had in place prohibitions against manumission in the state as per
statutes passed in 1801 and 1818, nothing prohibited manumission elsewhere, according
to Justice Joseph Lumpkin. As a result, he upheld various manumission plans, even
though he had "no partiality for foreign any more than domestic manumission," 386 but
he did not see it as within his purview to "dictate to more than a half a million of my
fellow-citizens." 387 He just wanted all free blacks to stay away, with no slave ever
experiencing a moment of freedom in Georgia before gaining manumission.3 88 The acts
against manumission "were intended to prevent the emancipation of people of color in
this State, where their presence could not fail to be injurious to the slave
population.... to the annoyance and injury of the owners of slaves." 389 They were the
allies of Northern abolitionists, bent upon ending slavery through the South, and it only
threatened to get worse as time went on and more and more slaves became free:
Neither humanity, nor religion, nor common justice, requires of us to sanction or favor
domestic emancipation; to give our slaves their liberty at the risk of losing our own. They
are incapable of taking part with ourselves, in the exercise of self government. To set up a
model empire for the world, God in His wisdom planted on this virgin soil, the best blood
of the human family. To allow it to be contaminated, is to be recreant to the weighty and
solemn trust committed to our hands.
390
But as for mixed-race individuals, the danger was that they might pass for white
and associate with whites on levels of social equality. As for the white men who had
children by black and mixed-race women, they were contemptible. Commenting about
Joseph Nunez, the mixed-race child of a Portuguese man, James Nunez said, "he never
learned to write his own name, and took up with negroes as his associates," 39 1 instead of
maintaining some level of society that he should have aspired to, as a man of some
property.392  He married one of his slaves. 393  But Joseph was only following the
381. Cooper, 10 Ga. at 265.




386. Sanders v. Ward, 25 Ga. 109, 124 (1858).
387. Id.
388. See e.g. Drone v. Beall, 21 Ga. 21 (1857). The testator willed that various slaves could be as "free as
the laws" permitted. Id. at 38. Others were to become free and then move to free states or Liberia, but they
were to remain on the plantation for four years, working in order to raise funds for their upkeep upon their
removal. Id. at 40-41. But the manumission plan failed, because its provisions would have had the slaves
working for themselves, "enjoying the profits of their own skill and labor." Id. at 44.
389. Clelandv. Waters, 16 Ga. 496, 517 (1854).
390. Vance, 4 Ga. at 459.
391. Bryan, 33 Ga. Supp. at 23.
392. Id. at 23-24.
393. Id. at 23.
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example of his father, who took a mulatto woman as his concubine, yet thought of
himself as a gentleman. Men of this type were the ones who blurred the racial lines by
trying to set their slave children free, and giving them monetary legacies. Lumpkin
wanted nothing to do with such men or their children: "Which of us has not narrowly
escaped petting one of the pretty little mulattoes belonging to our neighbors as one of the
family?" 394 But they were family in the eyes of some white men, the testators whose
wills were at stake, regardless of whether the law or their communities agreed.
In cases where legacies to children were at stake, the Mississippi Supreme Court,
on the other hand, appeared least willing to recognize the biological ties between
testators and their children, and the desires those men might have had in keeping the
children nearby and living with them. The formalist language of slavery gave them
something to hide behind, particularly due to "the statute of Mississippi prohibiting
owners of slaves to set them free without an act of the legislature (upon proof of
meritorious or distinguished services rendered by such slaves) approbating such act of
emancipation." 395 These narrow prescriptions meant that the fathers of slaves could not
free their children by deed or will. Fathers who sought to do so thus had to use their
ingenuity.
Elisha Brazealle took his son, John Monroe, and the child's mother to Ohio in
1826, where he gave them deeds of manumission. 396 They then returned to Mississippi,
where they lived until Elisha's death.397 In his will, "he recited the fact that such a deed
had been executed, and declared his intention to ratify it, and devised his property to the
said John Munroe, acknowledging him to be his son." 398 Bringing suit were Elisha's
heirs at law.399 But Chief Justice William L. Sharkey, in writing for the court, refused to
affirm the trial court's judgment in favor of John Monroe. The emancipation was void,
because "[n]o state is bound to recognise or enforce a contract made elsewhere, which
would injure the state or its citizens . . . . "400 Brazealle, in freeing his son, recognizing
him, and giving him property, contravened the social policy against increasing the local
free negro population, and undoubtedly violated norms against racial mixing: "[T]he
contract had its origin in an offense against morality, pernicious and detestable as an
example. But above all ... planned and executed with a fixed design to evade the rigor
of the laws of this state.'
40 1
But Jonathan Carter wanted to go further, and send his mixed-race daughter into
the white world, where she might pass for white. He conveyed to Joseph Barksdale "a
yellow girl, nearly white, named Harriet, aged twelve years, born of the house-woman
IA02 403Fanny.' 4 °2 Barksdale was to raise her as a white girl. Carter instructed that she was
394. Id. at 24.
395. Hinds, 3 Miss. at 837-38.
396. Id. at 837.
397. Id. at 841.
398. Id.
399. Id.
400. Hinds, 3 Miss. at 842.
401. Id. at 843.
402. Barksdale v. Elam, 30 Miss. 694, 694-95 (1856).
403. Id. at 695.
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not to be treated like a slave, was to enjoy the fruits of her own labor and live in
Barksdale's household.4 04 She could complain to her guardians, B.B. Wilkes and his
wife, Elizabeth, if she was being mistreated.4 °5 If she married a free white man,
Barksdale and her guardians were authorized to set aside property for the benefit of her
and her children. 40 6 Those terms, granting her nominal slave status, in the eyes of
Justice Ephraim S. Fisher, did not mean the deed of sale was void. Instead, the illegal
conditions were "contrary to the spirit and policy of our laws.' 4 07 Barksdale owned her
outright and was not obligated to fulfill the terms stated in the will, as a matter of law;
that meant Harriet had no recourse if the terms of the will were not fulfilled.
40 8
One means available to testators wishing to free their children and give them
property entailed sending them out of the state, never to return. Thus, James Brown took
Harriet, a mulatto woman who was his slave, and their two children, Francis and Jerome,
to Ohio. 409 He gave them deeds of manumission and then took them to Indiana, where
he owned property. 4 10 He sent the children to school.4 1 1 They lived there with their
mother and did not return to Mississippi; instead, Brown visited them.4 12 Brown died
there in 1856.413 Described by Justice Alexander Handy as "[i]nfatuated or debased,' 4 14
he nonetheless made an effective devise of his property.4 15 Everything was to be sold,
including all his property and slaves in Mississippi, "and, after paying the debts of the
testator ... deposit the surplus in the Bank of Louisiana, subject to the order of Francis
M. Brown; and, in the case of his death, subject to the order of Jerome B. Brown. ' 4 16
Neither his sons nor their mother could hold property in their home state, because
it was illegal for free blacks to remain or immigrate, insofar as "[tihe mischief intended
to be prevented, was their improper interference with our slaves, or the force of their
example, in producing discontent and insubordination among them .... ,,417 The
language used to define them, young men who had been born and raised in Mississippi,
and who were the children and heirs of a white male resident, was significant. Freed by
their father and living in the North, they were, in the eyes of the heirs at law, similar to
"alien enemies, outlaws, or banished persons, and are excluded from all protection of our
laws, and from the enjoyment of all rights here .. ,418 Justice Handy did not agree
with that harsh assessment, however. All the evils stemming from their status as free




407. Barksdale, 30 Miss. at 697.
408. Id.
409. Shaw, 35 Miss. at 248.
410. Id. at 249-50.
411. Id. at 250.
412. Id.
413. Id.
414. Shaw, 35 Miss. at 308.
415. Id.
416. Id. at 249.
417. Id. at318.
418. Id. at 314-15.
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receive their legacies.4 19 Richard D. Shaw, the executor, was charged with conducting
the sale.420 The money was to go directly to a bank in Louisiana.
4 21
But that scheme for leaving property did not last long. One year later, the
Mississippi Supreme Court decided Mitchell v. Wells,4 22 a case with a fact pattern
similar to that in Shaw. The court, unlike in Shaw, refused to uphold the bequest. Nancy
Wells was the daughter of her slave owner, Edward Wells, who died in 1848.423 She
alleged that her father freed her by taking her to Ohio in 1846 and settling her there.
4 2 4
When he died, he gave her a legacy of a watch, a bed, and three thousand dollars.
42 5
Since she was still a minor, he charged the executor to manage it.426 The estate was
resolved and the property divided, but William Mitchell refused to turn over the money,
though it was rightfully hers: "[T]he defendant retains the legacy on the pretext that
complainant is a slave," but her father, and the laws of Ohio "recognized and treated her
as a free woman.' ' 27 William Mitchell replied that Nancy Wells was still a slave,
because any manumission had been fraudulent: "[T]he testator took complainant to Ohio
in fraud of the laws of Mississippi, and with the intention to return to this State . ,428
In his view, she never really lived in Ohio, since she returned to Mississippi eighteen
months after she left.42 9
Justice William Harris, in writing for the court, focused not on the reasons why
Edward Wells would have given Nancy Wells the bequest, or on whether she truly was a
resident of Ohio. Instead, his sole concern was on what her freedom and access to
property might mean to Mississippi: "[O]n the subject of African slavery, we find this
race in this inferior, subordinate, subjugated condition, at the time of the adoption of our
Federal Constitution .... unfit by their nature and constitution to become citizens and
equal associates with the white race in this family of States .... 430 Slavery was
essential to the social, political, and cultural well being of whites in the state. Thus, the
state had "a right to full protection ... both for the enjoyment of her property in slaves,
and against the degradation of political companionship, association, and equality with
them in the future. ' 3 1 The Mississippi justice, hiding behind the formalism of slavery
to deny paternalism, did not talk about the father-child relationship.
The popular understanding of Louisiana slave society is that it was a more liberal
society, where interracialism was more fluid. Mixed-race liaisons were more common
and tolerated, leading to a population of free people of color who occupied a middle
ground between white and black. Thus, the French Counsel at New Orleans explained to
419. Shaw, 35 Miss. at 319-20.
420. Id. at 319.
421. Id.
422. 37 Miss. 235.




427. Mitchell, 37 Miss. at 237.
428. Id.
429. Id. at 236-37.
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Alexis de Tocqueville in 1832 that the nature of Louisiana's slave society contributed to
"[g]reat immorality" among the colored population, for "[t]he law in some sort destines
women of colour to wantonness. ' '432 Even though some were very light-skinned and
appeared to be white, they were barred from full participation in white society.
433
Educated and cultured, the one drop rule applied, insofar as "tradition [made] it known
that there [was] African blood in their veins. '4 34 In this caste society, darker skinned
people of African descent, including slaves and light-skinned blacks, looked at each
other across a divide. The lighter-skinned blacks were more like whites, but they were
not really white. Neither were they fully black. Women of this group could not
intermarry with whites, and marrying a man of color was not advantageous, "for men of
colour do not even enjoy the shameful privileges that are accorded to their women.' 435
Among these privileges was undoubtedly the access they had to wealth through their
white male protectors.
The quadroon ball, long notorious in New Orleans society, was the "link produced
by immorality between the two races,''436 where one might see "[c]oloured women
destined in a way by the law to concubinage." 437 The romanticized view explains that
free black women, oftentimes of mixed race, went to the balls in search of a white man
who would set her up as his mistress, providing her a house in which to live and money
for her support.4 38 Living in a society where their access to wealth was proscribed,
concubinage could be a means of becoming upwardly mobile, as the men supported
them, paid for their upkeep, and took care of any children they had. These women had
status as free women who ran households and owned slaves. But how were they treated
under the law? What was the effect of being barred from the status of wife?
Because these women had free status, did they have room to negotiate the bases of
their relationships? It appears they did. Will contests before the courts raised the
question whether white men and the black women with whom they were involved were
lifetime partners or whether the women were in fact concubines. These were free
women, able to sue. But what could they sue for? What could they expect to gain? If a
woman alleged that she and the man lived together as lifetime partners, notwithstanding
the lack of marriage, she could lay a claim for part of his estate: "In the universal
partnership, all goods and effects, both present and future, [became] immediately the
joint property of the contracting parties. '439 But the concubine, seen as nothing more
than a servant "[whose] union was an immoral one," 440 had no cause of action to sue for
432. Alexis de Tocqueville, Journey to America 100 (J.P. Mayer ed., George Lawrence trans., Anchor Bks.
1971).
433. See e.g. Neither Slave nor Free, supra n. 92; Genovese, Within the Plantation Household, supra n. 9, at
261-63.
434. de Tocqueville, supra n. 432, at 100.
435. Id.
436. Id. at 165.
437. Id.
438. See supra n. 25 and accompanying text.
439. Bore's Executor v. Quierry's Executor, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 545, 551 (La. 1816).
440. Id. at 554. See also Tonnelier v. Maurin's Executor, 2 Mart. (O.S.) 206 (La. Super. 1st Dist. 1812) ("A
[woman] of color, living with the deceased, [a white man, and] allowing him to receive her negroes' hire
without calling him to account, is presumed to have allowed the hire as her part of their joint expense.").
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his entire estate. She could only inherit "a donation of moveables [limited] to one-tenth
part of the whole value of the testator's estate."
44 1
Any executor or heir could thus sue for property alleged to have been given by a
white testator to his concubine, including in one case a gift, made before death, of notes
amounting to $123,451.50.442 This was the amount in notes that Boni, a free woman of
color living with Hart, had in her possession when Hart died.44 3 Hart's executors,
charged with "powers to take possession and inventory, ' '444 were thus "authorised to
bring an action to recover ... any property which may have belonged to the testator at
his death.' '44 Because Boni had no legitimate status, she could be dispossessed.44 6
Some women, like Anna Sinnet, could be pushed out of the houses they lived
in. Sinnet had lived with Joseph Uzee in concubinage, but prior to his marriage.44 8
She bought a slave for seven hundred dollars cash and, in 1841, Uzee sold her a house
for thirty-five hundred dollars.44 9 The court found the purchases to be made with Uzee's
money, because "[t]he fact of concubinage and the absolute inability of Anna Sinnet to
pay the price mentioned in the acts of sale . . . and the evidence in the record
satisfactorily shows those sales to have been disguised donations. '45° On the other hand,
in a case in which Gregorio Bergel conveyed all his property to Mary Bergel, a free
woman of color who had once been his slave but who later became his mistress, the
claimant creditors, alleging the sale fraudulent, were obliged to prove that the
conveyance had been done in contemplation of his debt, for the sole purpose of evading
payment. 45 1 In the eyes of the high court, they had not done so. 4 5 2 The court came to
this conclusion because "the sale was in January, 1833, and the judgment was not
rendered against Bergel, until January, 1834 ... [The notes,] due in August,
1826, ... apparently, had been prescribed by [a] lapse of five years.' '453 Nonetheless, at
stake were not just the interests of the debtors, but also those of the heirs at law.4 54 As a
result, the court remanded.4 55
Lawsuits such as these could also be a means of claiming money belonging to free
black women of independent means who, were involved with white men. Eugene
Macarty began, in 1796, what was to become a long-term relationship with a free woman
of color that lasted until his death in the 1840s. 456 It was "the nearest approach to
441. Compton v. Prescott, 12 Rob. (LA) 56, 69 (La. 1845). Moveables amounted to personal property, not
land and houses.
442. Executors of Hart v. Boni, 6 La. 97, 97-98 (1833).
443. Id.
444. Id. at 98.
445. Id. at 99.
446. Id.
447. Dupre v. Uzee, 6 La. Ann. 280 (La. 1851).
448. Id. at 281.
449. Id.
450. Id.
451. Lopez's Heirs v. Bergel, 12 La. 197, 197-98 (1838).
452. Id. at 201-02.
453. Id. at 201.
454. Id. at201-02.
455. Id. at 202.
456. Macarty v. Mandeville, 3 La. Ann. 239, 240 (La. 1848).
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marriage which the law recognized, and in the days in which their union commenced it
imposed serious moral obligations. It received the consent of her family, which was one
of the most distinguished in Louisiana. .. ."457 She belonged to the Mandeville family,
and although she was the defendant in the lawsuit, she was identified only as "a person
of color. 'A58 Her first name was not given. Was she part of a distinguished free family
of color? Was she descended from a prominent white family? It is unclear. But what
was clear, however, was that she was "une femme extrbmement laborieuse" and
"econome.'A 59 An excellent businesswoman, she had made a fortune selling dry goods
and was worth more than $155,000, $111,200 of which was in the bank and in her
name.4 60  She had five children by Macarty and four survived.46 1  All were well
educated.46 2 Two sons were in business, and one lived on his income.463 A daughter
was married and lived in Cuba.
464
When Macarty died, his relatives claimed that the money was all his, that he had
given it to his mistress in contravention of the law limiting the inheritance rights of
concubines. 465 The action failed, however. Plenty of witnesses testified to her business
acumen. 466 She bought goods and property, selling them and making a hefty profit over
a lifetime of industry. 467 If anything, Macarty's money went toward a failing plantation
in Cuba, "the expenses of his own household, and of the education and establishment of
his own children." 468 Notwithstanding the evidence presented before the trial court that
proved Mandeville's wealth, the plaintiffs made appeals to race and slave culture, such
that Justice George Eustis felt compelled to answer:
We are not insensible to the appeal made to us in this case, in the interest of morals,
religion and social order ... [W]e have ... reversed the verdict of a jury, vindicating the
rights of heirs and restored to them a large estate, which a party had attempted to deprive
them of by an indirect donation to a concubine.... At the same time that we are bound to
give effect to our laws made in the interest of families, it would be an abuse to bring them
in conflict with the right of property.
469
The social order demanded that the law protect the property interests of white
relatives, elevating heirs over concubines not seen as life partners. That was what moral
and religious sentiments demanded. But in the instant case, Mandeville's obvious
property interests mattered more, even though in will contests such as this one, justices
could feel obliged to protect white relatives and the pureness of the white race. Thus,
according to Justice Isaac T. Preston: "[T]here exists in our State a public policy, perhaps
457. Id.
458. Id.
459. Id. (translated as: an extremely hardworking and economical woman).
460. Id.





466. Macarty, 3 La. Ann. at 241-42.
467. Id. at 241.
468. Id. at 244.
469. Id. at 245.
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an absolute necessity, to discourage the amalgamation of the white and colored
race .... Here, marriage between the two races is forbidden by law; the honor of
marriage shall not be debased by the connection.'
4 70
Although free women of color experienced disabilities under the law, slave women
suffered more. Not only could a slave woman be owned by a more privileged free
woman of color, but if she was freed by a will, the manumission could be denied if she
was alleged to have been the testator's concubine. That is what happened in the case of
Vail v. Bird.471 The rule that applied to free women of color was thus extended to the
slave woman, insofar as the bequest of freedom was deemed to be property-the
ownership of the self. The slave woman's status provided no legal excuse for her
concubinage, according to Justice Preston.4 72 A female slave named Jane was owned by
Henry C. Vail; he freed her in his will and gave her two promissory notes worth the sum
of two hundred dollars.473  His lawful heirs challenged the manumission, but the
executor objected, "because the slave was entirely subject to the power of her master and
without a will of her own.' '4 74 The lower court agreed with Bird and dismissed the
plaintiffs' suit.4 75 They appealed and Preston, writing for the high court, disagreed and
reversed.47 6 He found that under the law, Jane was protected: "The slave is undoubtedly
subject to the power of his master; but that means a lawful power, such as is consistent
with good morals. The laws do not subject the female slave to an involuntary and illicit
connexion with her master, but would protect her against that misfortune.'
47 7
It is unclear how the law protected Jane. Thomas R. R. Cobb,-a Southerner and a
lawyer, wrote on the slavery question, discussing just what the rights of slaves were in
this period:
Of the three great absolute rights guaranteed to every citizen by the common law, viz., the
right of personal security, the right of personal liberty, and the right of private property, the
slave, in a state of pure or absolute slavery, is totally deprived, being, as to life, liberty, and
property, under the absolute and uncontrolled dominion of his master ....
478
In Cobb's view, the rape of a female slave by her master was "almost unheard of; and the
known lasviciousness of the negro, [rendered] the possibility of its occurrence very
remote.
'479
Barred from testifying in her own offense and under the absolute dominion of the
man who owned her, the female slave could not bring a lawsuit, except for her freedom.
She could not file a complaint in the criminal courts that her master sexually assaulted
her. If she had children by her master, he was under no obligation to free her or them. If
470. Badillo v. Tio, 6 La. Ann. 129, 138 (La. 1851).




475. Id. at 224.
476. Vail, 6 La. Ann. at 224.
477. Id.
478. Thomas R. R. Cobb, An Inquiry into the Law of Negro Slavery in the United States of America 83 (U.
Ga. Press 1999).
479. Id. at 100.
2005]
47
Jones: Righteous Fathers, Vulnerable Old Men, and Degraded Creatures: So
Published by TU Law Digital Commons, 2004
746 TULSA LA W RE VIEW [Vol. 40:699
anything, the law enforced her subservience and made her vulnerable to exploitation.
Nonetheless, Preston found that "the female slave is peculiarly exposed, from her
condition, to the seductions of an unprincipled master. That is a misfortune; but it is so
rare in the case of concubinage that the seduction and temptation are not mutual that
exceptions to a general rule cannot be founded upon it.''48° A slave woman thus had, in
his opinion, a certain level of agency to negotiate a consensual sexual relationship with
her white male owner. But the contradiction was that such relationships, if they existed,
could be used to deny her the freedom and property the testator meant for her to have.
Thus Sukey Wormley's lack of a sexual relationship with her master saved her.
48 1
The heirs of M.C. Hardesty "[sought] to reduce [her] to slavery, and to deprive her of all
her property, upon the alleged grounds that she was the public concubine of
,48248Hardesty.' They lost at the trial court and appealed.48 3  Justice Thomas Slidell,
writing for the court, found that "[t]he evidence admitted at the trial [did] not prove
it... ,,414 In 1834, Hardesty petitioned to free Sukey and her daughter Adeline.
485
When he had bought them from Wright, their former owner, Sukey had given money
towards the purchase of their freedom. 486 The agreement between Hardesty and Wright
was that "Hardesty [would] emancipate her and her child as soon as she should refund
the money advanced. 'A87 And that is what she did:
[B]y unusual industry, economy, and good character, she afterwards made a great deal of
money, laboring day and night for the purpose of purchasing her offspring; that she has
paid for herself and them, and that what she now has is the fruit of her honest and
persevering exertions during a long course of years, in a community where she seems to
have enjoyed general confidence and respect.48
Apparently, Justice Slidell was willing to free her, even if she had been in
concubinage with Hardesty. 489 What mattered more was the agreement between the two
white men: "the fulfillment of his promise of emancipation-a lawful promise, which his
obligation to the vendor bound him to fulfill, and which legally enured to the benefit of
the slave .... ,,490
Even if a slave had some level of agency and could persuade her master to free her,
inheritance laws often limited the master's ability to do so. For example, under
Louisiana law, heirs were entitled to a guaranteed portion of a testators' estate, as
demonstrated by Adams v. Routh & Dorsey.49 1 Thus, even though William Adams Jr.
freed his slave Nancy in his will, "bequeathing her a sum of money," a watch and his
480. Vail, 6 La. Ann. at 223.
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furniture, his father successfully sued to have the bequest overruled, as "the forced heir
of the one undivided fourth of his son's estate.' 492 Giving Nancy freedom amounted to
giving her a sum of money in the value of her own worth, but since her worth was
49greater than the amount available for the heirs, the bequest failed.  She was worth one
thousand dollars, and the estate's value, excluding her, was worth $4,750.494 As for
"two bastard children of the testator," mixed-race children who received legacies of one
thousand dollars each under the will, they were to get their share after their grandfather
received his.
4 95
It is unclear whether the children were Nancy's. If they were, they were elevated
above her, to take their legacies while hers was denied. Because the court authorized
partition-a division of the property between all those receiving bequests-she could be
sold for the heirs' benefit because she was property considered part of the estate, not an
heiress with rights of inheritance. She was made the sacrifice for the benefit of the
testator's father and mixed-race children, who might have been hers. But in many
respects, slave women were sacrificed under the law. Their bodily autonomy was not
respected: they were valued only for their labor and the children they produced. Yet
their children, born of liaisons with white men, could escape enslavement and receive
property from their fathers.
Those freeborn children could be acknowledged, even though they were
illegitimate, provided their fathers did so "in the registry of the birth or baptism, or by a
declaration before a notary public, in [the] presence of two witnesses. ' '496  Proof of
paternity, was not enough; the formal steps had to be pursued.497 If the father was
married, the children sustained further disabilities, because "bastards, adulterous or
incestuous, even duly acknowledged, [did] not enjoy the right of [inheritance] .... 498
But white illegitimate children (not of adulterous or incestuous unions) could prove their
paternal descent, even if they had "not been legally acknowledged ..... provided they be
free and white. ' '499 This proscription was necessary, because in the opinion of Justice
Francois-Xavier Martin, "a native of France who had received his earliest education in a
Jesuit academy," 500 the new world of Louisiana called for new legal rules: "Cases of
bastardy, of very rare occurrence in France, [were], unfortunately, much more frequent
among us.... [T]hese [were] very important considerations which [imposed] on our
492. Id. at 121. Note that according to Virginia & Celesie v. Himel, 10 La. Ann. 185 (La. 1855),
emancipation under those circumstances could be viewed as a fraud upon the heirs, if the testator did not leave
enough money to pay the heirs their share of the estate. Id. at 187-88.
493. Adams, 8 La. Ann. at 121.
494. Id. If one calculates her value as a portion of the estate, she was worth about 21% of the estate. In the
eyes of the court, the bequest of her freedom was thus excessive. Id.
495. Id.
496. Pigeau v. Duvernay, 4 Mart. (O.S.) 265, 266 (La. 1816); see also Robinett v. Verdun's Vendees, 14 La.
542, 545-46 (1840).
497. Pigeau, 4 Mart. (O.S.) at 266.
498. Jung v. Doriocourt, 4 La. 175, 178 (1832).
499. Id. But see Grossberg, supra n. 15 (stating that under the Anglo-American common law, white
illegimates were also barred from inheriting from their fathers; however, in the case of white illegitimates, the
law did not preclude marriage between the parents).
500. Wiethoff, supra n. 16, at 150.
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courts a stricter observance of the liws relative to illegitimate children, especially those
of colour."
50 1
These laws had the effect of placing the mixed-race children of white fathers at a
distinct disadvantage when it came to claiming inheritances from them. Even if their
fathers intended they inherit, they could do so only if the men were unmarried at the time
of their birth and had the foresight to perform the formal steps of acknowledgement. It
did not matter whether a white father had formally acknowledged his white illegitimate
child. The child could inherit anyway. In a society where black women were deemed
concubines and barred from marrying their partners, their children lacked equal
protections under the law. It was thus easier for their children to be disinherited, and
more difficult for them to claim their status. Their fathers could easily disregard them,
and they had no recourse.
50 2
Such a policy operated to protect testators' estates, and Justice Pierre A. Rost,
"master of Destrehan Manor and a leader in Louisiana's sugar industry,"50 3 explained
that,
if colored children might make proof of their paternal descent from a white father, they
might receive by testamentary dispositions, portions of the father's estate, and without a
will, claim alimony from his legal heirs, thus giving direct encouragement to the degrading
evils which the exclusion of the proof by law was intended to remedy.
504
But "where the parent has been so lost to shame as to make an authentic act of his
degradation," 50 5 and the formal steps had thus been pursued, a mixed-race child could
inherit. But that inheritance was limited to only a quarter of the estate: under Louisiana
law, if a testator died without legitimate descendants, he was forced to give a portion of
the estate to his collateral heirs.
50 6
Important too was protection of marriage, the fundamental building block of white
society. As Rost stated, "[h]ere, marriage between the two races is forbidden by law; the
honor of marriage shall not be debased by the connection. Moreover, the inestimable
advantages of marriage to society, shall not be disregarded by encouraging illicit and
debasing concubinage with the colored race."5 07 Recognizing the rights of mixed-race
colored children to claim a share of their fathers' estates would fly in the face of the
public policy and "diminish the father's estate to the prejudice of his white and lawful
heirs."
50 8
To permit marriage would mean the end of white society, the amalgamated race
Lumpkin of Georgia was so afraid of, and the end of slavery itself as slave women
achieved legal and social equality with white women through their relations with white
501. Jung, 4 La. at 180.
502. See e.g. Nouvet v. Vitry, 15 La. Ann. 653 (1860). Achille B. Courcelle lived with Louise A. Vitry for
nineteen years. Id. at 653. After he broke up with her, he successfully sued for property-real estate and
slaves-that he claimed he bought with his own money, but put title in her name. Id.
503. Wiethoff, supra n. 16, at 73.
504. Badillo, 6 La. Ann. at 138.
505. Id.
506. See e.g. Compton, 12 Rob. 56; Prevost v. Martel, 10 Rob. (LA) 512 (La. 1845).
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husbands eligible to free their wives. It would also spell the destruction of the South's
wealth in slave property as their mixed-race children gained status as the legitimate
children of their fathers. This parade of horribles was to be avoided at all costs. In the
case of elite white fathers of slave children, all legal channels to effectuate this social and
legal equality were to be barred, and their prerogatives as white men usurped, to their
shame, in the name of the greater social good: white supremacy.
Shaming testators who fathered mixed-race children was thus the ultimate goal of
legislators and justices who opposed those elite white men who sought to fulfill their
paternal obligations to children born of slave women and free women of color. Even
though the testators were dead, their cases undoubtedly provided examples to other men
who learned how other elite white men, the arbiters of society's rules, looked at them.
They were certainly free to live their lives as they wanted, and mixed-race intimacy was
so common in Louisiana as not to be unusual. But if they attempted to give to the
women and their children valuable property, freedom, or any foundation of wealth, they
would surely be slapped down. Their relatives would swoop down and destroy their
work by suing to overturn the will. Their status as elite white men did not save them in
this struggle over white supremacy and property.
VI. CONCLUSION
This article demonstrates the process by which justices of the high courts of the
Southern states negotiated the interests of white wealth and white supremacy through
will contests in cases where white men left bequests of freedom and property to black
women and their mixed-race children. To put it simply, the will contest, presents the
most significant aspect of this study: the clash of values. It was a conflict among elites,
and at stake was whether a white man could exercise the prerogatives of his race and
class. He certainly could exercise his prerogative and have sex with black women,
notwithstanding societal taboos against interracial sex. As a single or widowed man, he
was not constrained by conventional marriage to a white woman. But he was not
necessarily able to exercise his prerogative as a white man to do with his property as he
saw fit. He could not always fulfill what he saw as his moral responsibilities, to give the
women and his mixed-race children freedom and property. The testator's relatives,
entitled to their own prerogatives of legitimacy and whiteness, could sue to get his
property: the women and children at the heart of the will contest, and the money and real
property he hoped to give them. The courts that described the men as degraded or
vulnerable explained why his will should not stand: he was incompetent or enthralled by
a black woman who was permitted improper intimacies. The challengers were
successful, or not, depending upon the state of the law in their jurisdiction, and upon the
viewpoint of the high court justices who heard their cases.
Sympathetic justices respected testators' paternal instincts, while those who were
unsympathetic obeyed the formalism of the law of slavery, reinforcing the white social
order, retaining white wealth, and protecting the white heirs from having to recognize
their slave relatives. These justices gave the heirs what they wanted: the money and
property that would have gone to black people, who would only violate slavery's
precepts as they became entitled. They would become arrogant, as though they were
2005)
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white, when in fact, the testators' children were half-white and entitled by their
whiteness. To legitimate their connections and uphold the will would mean the end of
slave society. But insofar as some beneficiaries were successful, they became members
of the black elite, people of freedom and property. They did not have all the benefits of
freedom, but they occupied a middle ground between white and slave.
This study thus provides an important link for demonstrating the development of a
pre-Civil War black and mixed-race elite. It had its roots in people who were fortunate
enough to get their freedom long before most blacks did, and among them were black
women and their mixed-race black children freed within their home states of the South,
or brought to the North and freed. They were then able to live as free people with some
money and property. The key link in these instances was a white male progenitor who
freed them during life, or who gave them bequests of freedom upon his death. Questions
that remain, however, include: what happened to them afterwards? Did these free people
build upon their legacies? Did any of those privileged by wealth who looked "white"
pass into the white world? How did those who were nearly freed manage after getting so
close to freedom, only to lose it? These questions are beyond the scope of this article,
but they are important, nonetheless.
One might consider the ramifications for other slave cultures and legal systems.
How did miscegenation play out in the English colonies of the Caribbean? Slavery there
ended in the 1830s, long before it ended in the United States. What was the nature of
those slave societies? Was there as much social and legal control over slave masters'
ability to leave property to slave women and their children? What influence, if any, did
emancipation have upon the dynamic? On the other hand, justices hearing cases in
Louisiana often cited to French or Spanish law, since the territory was briefly under
Spain's control. Those laws could be used to deny freedom and the transfer of property.
But what happened in territories that were under the control of France and Spain for
longer periods of time, where the law of slavery might have had more time to develop,
territories such as the former colonies of Puerto Rico, Cuba, Martinique, or Guadeloupe?
The comparison might very well be worthwhile.
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